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FIXING FAIR USE 
MICHAEL W. CARROLL*
The fair use doctrine in copyright law balances expressive freedoms by 
permitting one to use another’s copyrighted expression under certain 
circumstances.  The doctrine’s extreme context-sensitivity renders it of little 
value to those who require reasonable ex ante certainty about the legality of 
a proposed use.  In this Article, Professor Carroll advances a legislative 
proposal to create a Fair Use Board in the U.S. Copyright Office that 
would have power to declare a proposed use of another’s copyrighted work to 
be a fair use.  Like a private letter ruling from the IRS or a “no action” 
letter from the SEC, a favorable opinion would immunize only the 
petitioner from copyright liability for the proposed use, leaving the copyright 
owner free to challenge the same or similar uses by other parties. The 
copyright owner would receive notice and an opportunity to challenge a 
petition.  Fair Use Rulings would be subject to administrative review in the 
Copyright Office and to judicial review by the federal courts of appeals.  The 
Article closes with discussion of alternative approaches to fixing fair use. 
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What is Fair Use?  We would all appreciate a clear, crisp answer. . . . .[F]ar 
from clear and crisp, fair use is better described as a shadowy territory whose 
boundaries are disputed, more so now that it includes cyberspace than ever 
before.. . . . [M]any legal scholars, politicians, copyright owners and users and 
their lawyers agree that fair use is so hard to understand that it fails to provide 
effective guidance for the use of others' works today. But the fact is, we really 
must understand and rely on it.1
INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law grants broad exclusive rights to encourage 
authors to create and to distribute new expressive works.  These rights 
are powerful.  Using copyright, a sculptor can halt distribution of a 
major motion picture because a scene in the film uses the image of his 
sculpture without authorization;2 the heir of a famous author can 
threaten to halt publication of unfavorable scholarship;3 and a 
songwriter can restrain distribution of a song that borrows three words 
and a portion of the melody from his song.4 While this power renders 
the author’s expression marketable,5 this power is also subject to 
abuse.6
1 Office of General Counsel, University of Texas, Fair Use of Copyrighted Materials at 
http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectualProperty/copypol2.htm (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
2 Sculptor Frederick E. Hart brought suit to enjoin distribution of the film, “Devil’s 
Advocate,” which included a scene in which Hart’s bas-relief sculpture, Ex Nihilo, at the 
entrance to the Washington National Cathedral, comes to life. See Brooke A. Masters, Va. 
Judge Tells Filmmaker to Settle Suit or Halt Video, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1998, at B2. The court 
issued a deadline for settlement after which it would issue a preliminary injunction to stop 
distribution of more than 400,000 videotapes of the film. Id. Warner Brothers studio asserted 
that, if issued, the injunction would cost the studio and video stores more than $42 million. 
See id.; see also Lawrence Siskind, The Devil's Advocate, 20 LEGAL TIMES at 23 (Mar. 23, 1998) 
(discussing case); K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright Infringement and the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS 
L.J. 173, 188-90 (2000) (describing this and similar cases). 
3 See, e.g., D. T. Max, The Injustice Collector, THE NEW YORKER, Jun. 19, 2006, (describing use 
of copyright law by James Joyce’s grandson to threaten scholars). 
4 See Grand Upright Music, Ltd v. Warner Brothers Records, Inc.,780 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (enjoining song by rapper Biz Markie that sampled Gilbert O’Sullivan’s “Alone Again 
(Naturally)”). 
5 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”). 
6 See, e.g., West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1229 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(affirming preliminary injunction against Lexis for distributing public domain judicial 
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 When fashioning modern copyright law, Congress recognized 
that circumstances would arise in which the broad sweep of copyright 
would be socially undesirable, and it responded by codifying a series of 
limitations on copyright’s scope.7 Fair use is the first and most general 
of these limitations.8 It renders unauthorized use of a copyrighted 
work non-infringing if the balance of a set of context-specific factors 
favors such use. 
 While the doctrine’s attention to context has many salutary 
attributes, it is so case-specific that it offers precious little guidance 
about its scope to artists, educators, journalists, Internet speakers and 
other who require use of another’s copyrighted expression in order to 
communicate effectively.9 The conventional wisdom is that this ex ante 
uncertainty is simply the price that policymakers must accept for 
choosing a standard over a rule.10 By this logic, if legal uncertainty 
about copyright law’s scope has become more troubling in the digital 
era – and it has – Congress should clarify fair use by rendering it more 
rule-like, as has been done through the fair dealing privilege found in 
English, Canadian and Australian law.11 
This Article intervenes in the general rules/standards discourse 
by showing that the law can have its context-sensitive standards and 
use them too by coupling standards with an advisory opinion 
mechanism that provides ex ante certainty in specific cases.  Such a 
mechanism already has been deployed in a variety of branches of 
federal law, such as federal regulation of income taxation,12 sale of 
securities,13 and subsidized health care.14 In operation, the advisory 
 
opinions marked up with West’s allegedly copyrighted page numbers). But see Matthew 
Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that West’s 
star pagination feature not protected by copyright). 
7 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (defining limitations on copyrightable subject matter); id. §§ 107-122 
(imposing limitations on scope of exclusive rights). 
8 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004). 
9 See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (documenting agreement concerning fair use 
uncertainty). 
10 See infra note 51 (citing to the rules/standards literature). 
11 See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of fair use rules, 
including fair dealing). 
12 See 26 U.S.C. § 7805; Rev. Proc. 2004-1, § 2.01 (“A ‘letter ruling’ is a written determination 
issued to a taxpayer by the Associate office that interprets and applies the tax laws to the 
taxpayer’s specific set of facts.”). 
13 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1-2 (authorizing “No Action Letter”). 
14 See 42 C.F.R. § 411.370B.380 (authorizing advisory opinions regarding Medicare statute). 
Vol. ##] FIXING FAIR USE 5 
Version 1.3 – November 10, 2006 
opinion provides guidance in particular situations without creating a 
thick body of binding precedent that ossifies the regulatory system. 
 This Article applies this insight by advancing a legislative 
proposal to create a Fair Use Board in the Copyright Office that would 
have authority to adjudicate fair use petitions and, subject to judicial 
review, issue Fair Use Rulings.  The effect of such a ruling, if favorable, 
would be roughly analogous to a Private Letter Ruling from the 
Internal Revenue Service15 or a “No Action” Letter from the Securities 
and Exchange Commission16 - the individual user would be immune 
from copyright liability for the proposed use but the ruling would be 
non-precedential.  Under the proposal, the fair use petitioner would be 
obliged to serve notice on the copyright owner, who would have an 
opportunity to contest the petition. Either party could appeal an 
unfavorable ruling administratively and then to any federal circuit court 
of appeals with personal jurisdiction over the parties. 
 The proposal is fair-use neutral because it would not change the 
substantive entitlements granted by the Copyright Act.  Rather, it 
would simply give fair use a fair chance.  Copyright owners would have 
a full opportunity to assert their rights and would be no more 
prejudiced by choosing not to contest particular petitions than they 
currently are when they choose not to pursue action against uses they 
deem infringing. 
 The problems caused by fair use uncertainty are sufficiently 
urgent that I also endorse two less attractive proposals in the 
alternative, in the event that the primary proposal is ahead of its time.  
These alternatives focus on a different approach to fixing fair use – 
reducing the risks of relying on fair use by limiting the remedies 
available against a user who misinterprets the doctrine’s scope in good 
faith. Under the first alternative, Congress would still create a Fair Use 
Board, but the Board would serve only an advisory capacity.  A 
 
15 See 26 U.S.C. § 7805; Rev. Proc. 2004-1, § 2.01 (“A ‘letter ruling’ is a written determination 
issued to a taxpayer by the Associate office that interprets and applies the tax laws to the 
taxpayer’s specific set of facts.”). 
16 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1-2.  No Action letters represent the position of the SEC’s 
enforcement staff with respect to a proposed transaction, and the Commission is not bound 
by that position.  See id.  However, these appear to be treated as binding de facto.  See Donna 
M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems 
and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 943 (1998) (“[R]ecipients highly value 
no-action letters, undoubtedly because the Commission appears to have never proceeded 
against the recipient of a no-action letter who acted in good faith on the letter's advice.”). 
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favorable fair use opinion would limit a user’s liability in the event that 
a court subsequently determined that the subject use was infringing.17 
Under the second alternative, Congress would extend to all potential 
fair users a limit on statutory damages currently available only to 
libraries, archives, colleges, universities, and public broadcasters.18 
Finally, this Article analyzes why attempts to fix fair use by 
rendering it more rule-like would be normatively unattractive and 
would be likely to be ineffective in any case.  Congress correctly 
rejected rule-like proposals when it codified fair use in the Copyright 
Act of 1976 because rules would be likely to be significantly over- and 
under-inclusive.  The expressive interests of authors and potential fair 
users are of constitutional import and should be balanced with a degree 
of context-sensitivity that rules cannot supply.  
 
I. FAIR USE UNCERTAINTY 
A. Overview 
 
The fair use doctrine is rooted in the truth that we sometimes 
must use the expression of another to express ourselves effectively.19 
Fair use protects a zone of expressive opportunity for criticism, 
comment, parody, education, and other socially beneficial forms of 
 
17 This proposal could be implemented in conjunction with the current legislative process 
concerning orphan works. See The Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (May 22, 2006) at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5439; UNITED 
STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (Jan. 2006) (suggesting proposals 
for limiting liability of user who made good faith effort to find untraceable copyright owner). 
18 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2004). This limitation applies when one of these privileged users 
infringes copyright with a mistaken but good faith belief that the use was a fair use.  In 
addition, this alternative proposal would limit the availability of injunctive relief in the case 
of users acting in good faith. 
19 See. e.g., Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Story,  J.) 
(principal judicial architect of fair use doctrine recognizing that “[e]very book in literature, 
science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known 
and used before”).  Some may be inclined to contest this truth claim.  But, in its most limited 
form, the claim holds that we must be able to quote one another to communicate effectively, 
and I am aware of no legislator, judicial officer or copyright scholar who contests the value 
of copyright law’s privilege for unauthorized quotation. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Text 1971) art. 10(1) (“It shall be 
permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully made available 
to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice, and their extent 
does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from newspaper Articles 
and periodicals in the form of press summaries.”). 
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communication which might not occur if copyright owners were given 
complete control over how their works were used.  Recently, fair use 
has been called upon to serve this function in a variety of new 
situations because wide distribution of digital technologies has greatly 
increased copyright law’s domain while also giving rise to a significantly 
larger pool of potential fair users attracted to the remarkable 
reproductive and adaptive power of these new technologies. The 
dispute over Google’s digitization of large library collections is one of 
many signs demonstrating that, in the digital age, questions of fair use 
have taken on greater urgency.20 
The Supreme Court has further fueled this urgency by 
recognizing without describing the constitutional substrate 
undergirding the fair use doctrine.  When faced with a claim that the 
First Amendment also directly secures a speaker’s right to use the 
expression of another under certain circumstances, Justice Ginsburg, 
writing for the Court, responded: 
 
The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to 
make--or decline to make--one's own speech; it bears 
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other 
people's speeches. To the extent such assertions raise 
First Amendment concerns, copyright's built-in free 
speech safeguards are generally adequate to address 
them. We recognize that the D. C. Circuit spoke too 
broadly when it declared copyrights "categorically 
immune from challenges under the First Amendment."  
But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the 
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First 
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.21 
20 See, e.g., The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y., complaint filed 
Sep. 20, 2005) (alleging that large-scale intermediate digitization of libraries’ book collections 
infringes copyright); Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library Project: A Copyright Analysis 
(analyzing Google’s fair use argument in response to The Author’s Guild suit) at 
http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/googleprint.pdf#search=%22jonathan%20band%2
0google%20fair%20use%22 (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
21 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). The Court had previously identified fair 
use as one of copyright law’s two free speech safeguards. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 
(“In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's 
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the 
latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant 
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Eldred does not hold that the fair use doctrine as currently interpreted 
is constitutionally required.  But, by rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s 
categorical immunity for copyright, the Court held a fortiori that at least 
some uses of another’s copyrighted expression qualify as speech 
protected by the First Amendment.  Thus, the holding in Eldred is that 
the fair use doctrine as currently interpreted usually provides a defense 
to infringement at least as robust as the one the First Amendment 
would require and therefore that First Amendment defense requires no 
further specification at this time.  From the free speech perspective, 
then, fair use is no constitutional understudy – it is the starring 
attraction. 
 Regrettably, the “built-in free speech safeguards” of copyright 
law lack important procedural protections for potential fair users that 
the First Amendment provides for those who utter other forms of 
protected speech. In particular, the Court, having recognized that the 
risk of legal uncertainty is of particular concern when the law regulates 
speech, has determined that the First Amendment requires the 
safeguards of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to contain such 
uncertainty.22 By contrast, the substantive context-sensitivity of the fair 
use doctrine often fails to rein in the vague and sometimes overly-
broad scope of copyright law.23 
Indeed, those familiar with copyright law are well acquainted 
with the difficulties in providing guidance concerning the application 
of the fair use doctrine, and federal judges themselves acknowledge the 
point.  Judge Posner, for example, has candidly admitted that only 
minimal guidance can be drawn from Section 107,24 and, Judge Leval 
has succinctly put the problem thus: 
 
for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to 
copyright.”).  
22 See infra note 144 (describing First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness). 
23 See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2007) (describing feedback loop in which fair use uncertainty leads to 
licensing that serves to reduce the scope of fair use in future cases). 
24 See Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (“The 
important point is simply that, as the Supreme Court made clear . . . the four factors are a 
checklist of things to be considered rather than a formula for decision; and likewise the list 
of statutory purposes.”); see also William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use And Statutory 
Reform In The Wake Of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004) (“All section 107 really amounts 
to in practical terms is confirmation that the courts are entitled to allow in the name of fair 
use a certain undefined amount of unauthorized copying from copyrighted works. This may 
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Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair 
use.  Earlier decisions provide little basis for predicting 
later ones.  Reversals and divided courts are 
commonplace.  . . . .  Confusion has not been confined 
to judges.  Writers, historians, publishers, and their legal 
advisers can only guess and pray as to how courts will 
resolve copyright disputes.25 
The treatise writers are in accord that the fair use doctrine 
produces significant ex ante uncertainty.26 Indeed, when writing more 
pointedly in a legal periodical, treatise author David Nimmer examined 
many fair use cases and the findings on each of the factors and 
concluded that “had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the 
particular four fair use factors . . .  it appears that the upshot would be 
the same.”27 That is to say, “the four factors fail to drive the analysis, 
but rather serve as convenient pegs on which to hang antecedent 
conclusions.”28 Other legal scholars also have expressed concerned 
about fair use uncertainty, and have suggested approaches different 
than this Article’s proposal to reduce it.29 
seem an unsatisfactory solution to the problem of defining fair use, and indeed the uncertain 
contours of the defense raise serious problems . . . .”). 
25 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 (1990). 
26 See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1][b] 
at 13-162 (citing e.g. Castle Rock v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 
1998)); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT §12.2.2 at 12:34 (3d.ed 2005); 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW ___ (2d ed. 1995); see also 
William Patry, What’s the Role of the Fourth Fair Use Factor?, The Patry Copyright Blog, May 3, 
2005, at http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005_05_01_williampatry_archive.html.
27 David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 263, 280 (2003). 
28 Id. at 281.  Professor Barton Beebe’s statistical analysis of more than 200 fair use opinions 
is consistent with this conclusion.  See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the U.S. Copyright 
Fair Use Cases, 1978-2005: A Quick Report of Initial Findings for IPSC 2006 (draft Aug. 10, 2006) 
(on file with author) (“While I know of no statistical way to show that courts are indeed 
putting the cart before the horse when they engage in a Section 107 analysis, the strong 
evidence of stampeding is at least consistent with Nimmer’s description.”). 
29 For example, Professor Jessica Litman would rein in the initial grant of rights to render 
users’ rights more ascertainable. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 166-86 (2001) 
(proposing unfair competition standard for infringement). Professor Michael Madison argues 
for a pattern-oriented approach to fair use and would amend Section 107 to give courts 
greater freedom to identify the social practices that should inform fair use analysis. See 
Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use  and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS &
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 The costs of fair use uncertainty are manifest.  Potential fair 
users routinely are deterred from engaging in a desired use by the 
uncertain scope of the fair use doctrine coupled with the high costs of 
litigation and the potentially enormous statutory damages that a court 
could award if it disagrees with the user’s fair use judgment.30 This is 
particularly the case when a potential fair user seeks to communicate 
with the public through traditional mass media or on the Internet.31 
For example, two recent reports, discussed in greater detail below, 
demonstrate that many media gatekeepers will not accept an author’s, 
musician’s, or filmmaker’s fair use determination, nor will they make 
one on their own.32 Instead these gatekeepers require copyright 
clearance any time an artist seeks to express herself with the speech of 
another through fair use quotation, incidental use, or even de minimis 
use.  Through these practices, fair use has been rendered unduly 
circumscribed or non-existent in important cultural spheres. 
 
ENT. L.J. 391 (2005); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004). Separately, rather than seeking a legislative response to fair use 
uncertainty, Professor Peter Jaszi, along with the Center for Social Media, has been working 
with documentary filmmakers to generate negotiated fair use norms that would be 
instantiated in a set of “best practices” adopted by content industries, particularly the film 
industry.  See DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE 
(2005) available at 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/publications/statement_of_best_practices_
in_fair_use/. The proposals advanced in this Article could work in conjunction with any of 
these approaches.  
30 See, e.g., generally MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE,
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE: FREE EXPRESSION IN 
THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL (2005) (reporting results of focus groups with creators 
and scholars concerning chilling effect of fair use uncertainty) at 
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf (visited Aug. 25, 2006); R. 
Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 
429 (2005) (discussing growing uncertainty concerning scope of fair use and “truly 
pernicious effects” of such uncertainty); Gibson, supra note XX, at ___[3-4] (same). 
31 See generally HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 5-6 (summarizing gatekeeping institutions 
that require copyright clearance for even very small uses of copyrighted works, such as the 
quotation of one or two sentences); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright As A Model For Free 
Speech Law: What Copyright Has In Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance 
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 20-21, 24 (2000) (describing 
chilling effects of copyright law’s vague scope). 
32 See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (discussing HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, 
and PAT AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE 
CULTURE (2004) at 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf (visited 
Aug. 25, 2006). 
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B.  Doctrinal Causes of Uncertainty 
 
If uncertainty about copyright’s scope chills expression, surely 
there must be doctrinal responses that would provide greater clarity?  
There has been no shortage of scholarly commentary directed at 
providing a fair use theory that would lead to such clarity.33 To date, 
however, Congress and the courts have resisted attempts to clarify fair 
use.  The remainder of this subsection explains why.  Readers already 
familiar with the doctrinal causes of fair use uncertainty may wish to 
proceed directly to the proposal in Section II. 
 
1. Copyright Infringement 
Copyright applies to any “original work of authorship” at the 
moment it is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”34 Originality 
is a very low standard that requires only a minimal spark of creativity.35 
As a consequence, copyright applies to a broad range of works, 
including shampoo bottle labels,36 technical manuals,37 county tax 
 
33 A sample of this extensive literature includes: Symposium, Fair Use:  Threat or Threatened?,
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (2005); Laura R. Bradford,  Parody And Perception: Using Cognitive 
Research To Expand Fair Use In Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV. 705 (2005); Madison, Rewriting Fair 
Use, supra note 28; William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use And Statutory Reform In The 
Wake Of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair 
Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech And How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Raymond 
Shih Ray Ku, Consumers And Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 539 (2003); Nimmer, Fairest of Them All, supra note 26; Justin Hughes, Fair Use 
Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use In A Changing World, 50 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 133 (2003); Wendy Gordon, Excuse And Justification In The Law Of 
Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part Of The Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 149 (2003); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use And Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. 
Rev. 975 (2002); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, And Other Kinds Of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine For 
Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107 (2001); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
1291 (1999); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change The Less They Seem 
"Transformed": Some Reflections On Fair Use, 46 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 251 (1998); Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Putting Cars On The "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, And Copyright In 
Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466 (1995); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1992); Leval, supra note 21; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing 
The Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market 
Failure: A Structural And Economic Analysis Of The Betamax Case And Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1600 (1982). 
34 Id. §§  102(a); 201(a). 
35 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46  (1991). 
36 See, e.g., Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
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maps,38 commercial photographs of products,39 and in some cases even 
blank forms.40 
The Copyright Act grants authors the exclusive rights to 
reproduce, to publicly distribute, to publicly perform, to publicly 
display, and to adapt their copyrighted works.41 The copyright owner’s 
right to control reproduction of the work extends to partial borrowings 
and to adaptations so long as the defendant had access to the owner’s 
work and the defendant’s work is “substantially similar” to the 
copyright owner’s in the eyes of an ordinary observer.42 The copyright 
owner’s rights are limited to her original expression and do not 
encompass any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery.43 
Liability for copyright infringement is strict.  Under the current 
interpretation of the Copyright Act, members of the public who 
exercise any of the copyright owner’s rights without authorization are 
prima facie infringers regardless of their intent or knowledge. In this 
environment, producers, distributors, readers, viewers, and all other 
users have a strong interest in distinguishing between infringing events 
and non-infringing events. 
This is particularly true because the consequences of 
infringement can be quite severe.  Courts may enjoin the continued 
distribution of an infringing work and can order the destruction of all 
infringing copies.44 In addition, the copyright owner may elect at any 
 
37 See, e.g., Highland Tank & Mfg. Co. v. PS Intern., Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 348, 360-61 (W.D. 
Pa. 2005). 
38 See, e.g., County of Suffolk, New York v. First American Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 
179 (2d Cir. 2001). 
39 See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). 
40 See Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2003). 
41 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting rights to reproduce the work in copies, prepare derivative 
works, distribute the work in copies, publicly perform the work, or publicly display the 
work). 
42 See, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 70 (2d 
Cir.1999). 
43 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Line-drawing difficulties under the idea/expression dichotomy 
frequently arise in cases such as narrative works in which plot lines and characters resemble 
one another.  Does, for example, West Side Story borrow Shakespeare’s expression in 
Romeo and Juliet or merely his idea?  This particular difficulty is not the focus of our present 
concern, but fair use determinations are analogously difficult.  Logically, fair use does not 
arise as an issue until after the plaintiff establishes that the defendant used the plaintiff’s 
expression. 
44 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503(b). 
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time before final judgment is rendered to receive actual damages, 
including the infringer’s profits attributable to infringement, or 
statutory damages.45 The range for statutory damages is between $750 
and $30,000 per infringed work, and this amount can be increased to 
$150,000 per work if willful infringement is proven.46 (It is for this 
reason that the Recording Industry Association of America has 
threatened individuals hosting music files on peer-to-peer networks 
with the prospect of hundreds of millions of dollars in potential 
damages:  $150,000 x number of songs hosted = potential statutory 
damages.)  And, in many cases, the real threat is the fee-shifting 
provision by which defendants can be made to pay the copyright 
owner’s attorney’s fees, which can exceed the amount of damages.47 
2. Fair Use 
 
In the language of the Copyright Act, fair use is a “limitation” 
on the exclusive rights granted to the copyright owner.48 This language  
supports a reading that would require the copyright owner to prove 
infringement by showing that the defendant’s use exceeded the bounds 
of fair use.49 could be read to require the copyright owner to prove 
that the defendant had exceeded the bounds of fair use, currently the 
copyright owner need prove only ownership of a valid copyright and 
that the defendant exercised one of the exclusive rights with respect to 
 
45 See id. § 504. 
46 Id. 
47 See id. § 505; see also Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 
776 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting fair use defense and awarding copyright owner $210,000 in 
damages and $516,271 for attorneys’ fees); Marshall & Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F. 
Supp. 952, 954 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (same with $9,450 in damages and $38,713 for attorneys’ 
fees); Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A.0003-44444962, 2005 
WL 1244923, *1 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2005) (same with $150,000 in statutory damages and 
$205,586.67 for attorneys’ fees); Peter Jaszi, 505 and All That – The Defendant’s Dilemma, 55 
LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 107, 107 (1992) (“It seems likely that, over the years, no provision 
of the American copyright law has exceeded that now codified as 17 U.S.C. section 505 in 
influencing the actual conduct of infringement litigation.”). 
48 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004). 
49 Cf. Quality King v. L’Anza, 523 U.S. 123, 144-45 (1998) (emphasizing that Section 106 
rights are limited by Sections 107-120). 
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the registered work.50 The defendant must prove fair use as an 
affirmative defense.51 
The scope of the fair use defense is sufficiently uncertain in 
light of the potential penalties to scare away a sizeable portion of 
potential users whose proposed use of a copyrighted work would be 
fair if the matter were litigated to judgment. To see why, begin with 
Section 107, which provides: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such 
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any 
other means specified by that section, for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a 
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include-- 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work. 
 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon 
consideration of all the above factors.52 
50 See, e.g. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d 
Cir.1998). 
51 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 
U.S. at 561; Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 
197 (3d Cir.2003). 
52 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
Vol. ##] FIXING FAIR USE 15 
Version 1.3 – November 10, 2006 
 Within the literature on rules and standards,53 fair use is a 
quintessential standard.54 It is well established that standards trade off 
greater ex ante certainty for greater ex post context-sensitivity unless 
cultural or other contextual factors function to cabin a decisionmaker’s 
discretion.55 One strategy for improving the ex ante certainty of a legal 
standard’s application is to subject its application to evidentiary 
presumptions, which limit the range of relevant evidence.  However, 
Congress and the courts have resisted attempts to deploy this 
strategy.56 Here is a quick summary of why this resistance has resulted 
in significant ex ante uncertainty about fair use.57 
Preamble. Section 107 identifies types of unauthorized uses of 
a copyrighted work that might be deemed fair – criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.  This list could serve 
to clarify the scope of a fair user’s right in two ways:   the list could be 
construed as exclusive and/or the listed uses could be deemed 
presumptively fair.  Courts have resisted both approaches.  The listed 
 
53 The rules/standards literature is substantial. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 
104 (1991); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379-
430 (1985); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592-93 
(1988); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783-90 
(1989); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995); Eric A. Posner, Standards, 
Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (1997). 
54 The terms “rules” and “standards” are at this point used as shorthand to differentiate 
degrees of ex post discretion enjoyed by those who apply the law, and it is in that sense that 
fair use is a standard.  But commentators have laid out more complex taxonomies according 
to which standards are differentiated from other provisions, such as multi-factor tests, which 
also provide significant ex post discretion. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 51, at 965.  For those 
for whom this is a distinction with a difference, I mean to say that fair use is a multi-factor 
test rather than a standard.   
55 See id. (acknowledging that ex post discretion conferred by standards and factors is subject 
to cabining by interpretive practices); Kaplow, supra note 51, at 559-60. 
56 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994): 
The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like 
the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.... Nor may the 
four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to 
be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of 
copyright. 
57 For a more detailed analysis of the language, see Madison, Pattern-Oriented Approach, supra 
note X, at 1550-64. 
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uses are illustrative only,58 and they are not entitled to a presumption of 
fairness.59 Consequently, the language of the preamble does little work 
in the judicial application of fair use.  The application of the factors 
leads to similar results. 
Purpose and Character of the Use. Under the first factor, 
courts focus on whether or not the use should be characterized as 
commercial and whether it should be deemed transformative.60 The 
defendant’s good faith has been added, or perhaps recognized, as a 
material sub-factor.61 A commercial use may tend to threaten the 
copyright owners’ core economic incentive and therefore tends to be 
less likely to be fair.  The Supreme Court initially favored a 
presumption against commercial use, defined broadly,62 but it soon 
recognized an overbreadth problem with such an approach.  Under 
current law all of the factors must be examined in evaluating a claim of 
fair use.63 
In contrast to the concerns for copyright owners engendered by 
commercial use, focus on transformative use emphasizes the public’s 
perspective by asking whether the user’s work supplants the original, 
“or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
 
58 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-579 (1994) (describing the 
preamble as containing examples that may guide analysis); Ringgold v. Black Entertainment 
Television, 126 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the examples in the preamble should 
not be completely ignored); Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(stating that the preamble is illustrative, and holding that the trial court erred in finding the 
list exclusive).  
59 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (stating that an educational purpose is not guaranteed to be a 
fair use); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) 
(stating that the statute was not intended to create any presumption of fairness). 
60 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608-09 (2d Cir. 
2006); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2003). 
61 See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute, 364 F.3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004); Nunez v. 
Caribbean Intern. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000); Beebe, supra note 27, at 12 
(finding that 13% of opinions reviewed explicitly considered whether defendant’s use was in 
good or bad faith). 
62 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984). The 
Court defined commercial use as “not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain 
but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without 
paying the customary price.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (holding that publishing an 
excerpt from a biography of President Ford in advance of publication by another who had 
the exclusive right not fair use). 
63 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 584; Sundeman v. Seajay Soc'y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 203 (4th 
Cir.1998). 
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message.”64 The doctrine of transformative use65 is a frequently-
litigated, though indeterminate sub-factor66 
Evidence of a defendant’s commercial exploitation, good faith, 
or expressive transformation of the plaintiff’s work will always be 
relevant to fair use analysis, but these considerations offset one another 
in any given case and so the law provides little ex ante guidance about 
the weight a court will assign to such evidence.67 
Nature of the Copyrighted Work. The second factor focuses 
on whether the work is factual rather than fictional and whether the 
work is published or unpublished.68 One function of this factor is to 
guard against enlarging the scope of rights in a factual compilation 
beyond the copyrighted selection or arrangement to cover the 
uncopyrightable facts.69 Generally, however, this factor serves as a 
thumb on the scale in favor of the copyright owner because most 
works are deemed creative.70 Even in cases involving factual works, 
this factor does little work if the court finds substantial creativity in the 
use of facts.71 
64 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval). 
65 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990) 
(coining the term and defining it as a productive use of the material for a different purpose). 
66 Id. But see Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Article: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 559-60 (2004) (arguing that doctrine of 
transformative use leads courts to undervalue expressive importance of copying).  
67 See, e.g., Compaq Computer, Inc. v. Ergonome, Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(evidence supported jury’s determination of fair use with respect to computer manufacturer’s 
unauthorized commercial use of photographs of proper hand position to avoid repetitive 
stress injury in computer user’s manual); NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 479 (finding that 
transformative nature of defendant’s work tipped first factor in its favor even though use 
was commercial and copy of plaintiff’s unpublished work assumed to have been acquired in 
bad faith); Los Angeles News Serv. v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 939-40 (9th Cir. 
2002) (describing uses as having offsetting commercial and transformative properties and 
concluding that first factor “weakly” favors fair use). 
68 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
69 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548 (stating that the creative element in even factual works 
has left the law “unsettled” with regard to the scope of protection for factual works); see also 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 496-497 (stating that factual works lend themselves more to productive use 
by others). 
70 See Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir. 
2006); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003); Dr. Seuss 
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1997). 
71 Compare Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490, 495 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that film of Muhammed Ali used was historical, and not particularly 
creatively rendered); and Robinson v. Random House, 877 F.Supp. 830, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
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With respect to publication status, the Harper & Row Court 
emphasized that the author should retain control over the initial 
dissemination of a work and therefore unauthorized uses of 
unpublished works will be less likely to be deemed fair.72 The Court 
appeared to have created a presumption against fair use in the case of 
unpublished works, and some lower courts appeared to have rendered 
this consideration outcome-determinative.73 In 1992, Congress 
responded to concerns expressed by the publishing industry by 
overruling any interpretations that treated unpublished works as 
entitled to a conclusive presumption against fair use.74 Consequently, 
the second factor tends to do little work in swaying the outcome of any 
fair use inquiry.75 
Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used. Copyright 
law excuses de minimis unauthorized exercise of a copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights.76 For purposes of the fair use inquiry, then, the third 
factor establishes a sliding scale above the de minimis threshold.77 The 
focus of the inquiry is on what was taken from the plaintiff’s work, not 
on how much of the defendant’s work is comprised of copied 
material.78 Theoretically, this factor should weigh increasingly against 
 
(finding that factor two favored infringer, though historical work contained creativity); with 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72-73 (2d Cir 1999) 
(finding the second factor at best neutral because the work was a creatively-expressed news 
article). 
72 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553 (citations omitted).  
73 See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991); New Era Publ’n Int’l, v. 
Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that unpublished work is 
usually completely protected); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 
1987) (stating that unpublished work is usually completely protected); Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 
623 F. Supp. 727, 723 (D. Ariz. 1986) (stating that fair use generally only applies to published 
works). 
74 See Fair Use of Unpublished Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492 (1992), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 
106 Stat. 3145 codified at 17 U.S.C. §107. 
75 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612 (“We recognize, however, that the second 
factor may be of limited usefulness where the creative work of art is being used for a 
transformative purpose.”); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2003). 
76 See, e.g., Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998); Ringgold 
v. Black Ent. TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75-77 (2d Cir. 1997); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software 
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1988). 
77 See Gordon v. Nextel Comm. and Mullen Advertising, Inc., 345 F.3d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 
2003) (“A court will examine the fair use defense only if the de minimis threshold for 
actionable copying has been exceeded.”). 
78 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (quoting  Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 
F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936)).  However, if a large portion of the infringing work is copied 
material, the court may infer that the copied work is qualitatively substantial.  Id. 
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the plaintiff as the quantitative amount taken increases.  However, this 
does not always follow.  On the one hand, the Harper & Row Court 
focused on qualitative analysis – whether the copied portion was the 
“heart” of the work – which renders quantitative analysis largely 
immaterial.79 On the other hand, the third factor must be weighed 
with the purpose and character of the use in mind, which can render 
even quantitatively large borrowings fair.80 
Effect Upon the Potential Market. If copyright is to supply 
authors with an economic incentive to create, unauthorized uses that 
undermine the incentive by sufficiently reducing the copyright owner’s 
ability to profit from the work will be deemed unfair.  This factor will 
be determinative in rendering run-of-the-mine infringements, such as 
the sale of “bootlegged” CDs or DVDs, unfair.81 However, the 
analysis under this factor extends beyond the defendant’s use and 
beyond the plaintiff’s existing sales and licensing markets.  Instead, the 
fourth factor can weigh against a finding of fair use if the use were to 
become widespread or were to affect the plaintiff’s potential markets.82 
The Court has held that there must be a distinction between 
suppressing demand and usurping it.83 Destruction of demand for a 
 
79 See id. (quoting 557 F. Supp. at 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
80 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-587 (1994); id. at 580 (stating 
definition of parody requires imitation of the original work to comment upon it). Compare 
Los Angeles News Service v. KCAL-TV, 108 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that 
though KCAL took only a small amount of news footage, it was “all that mattered”); 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 925-926 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding 
that each article within a larger periodical was a separate copyrightable work, rather than a 
small portion of one work); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 
132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that making Seinfeld quiz book was entertainment, not 
criticism, so amount taken was substantial) with Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 
194, 205-206 (4th Cir 1998) (finding that substantial significant portion of copyrighted work 
was not the “heart” of the work, nor was it quantitatively large in light of the educational 
purpose). 
81 See, e.g., U.S. v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003) (no abuse of discretion in refusing 
fair use instruction in criminal trial concerning unauthorized distribution of software). 
82 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)); see also Castle Rock, 150 F.3d, at 145-146 (finding that even if 
the copyright owner would not take advantage of that market, the fact that they could 
weighs against fair use) and American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930-931 (finding that since the 
licensing of individual articles had become available in the industry, the potential license fees 
could be evidence of market harm) . 
83 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (citations omitted); see also Castle Rock, 150 F.3d, at 145 
(making the distinction between parody, which would not be the owner’s market, and 
tribute, which would). 
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work in the absence of replacing it with copied material is not a 
cognizable loss.84 The hard evidentiary questions for courts concern 
the likelihood that the defendant’s use might become widespread and 
the likelihood that a market will emerge to supply a license or sale for 
such use.85 
As a doctrinal matter, the status of the fourth factor is 
contested.  In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court pronounced this to be 
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”86 The 
Court subsequently retreated, emphasizing again the case-specific 
nature of the doctrine and holding that no factor was entitled to 
privileged status in fair use analysis.87 Nonetheless, some lower courts 
continue to follow the Harper & Row dictum.88 
Summary.  The broad legal standard set forth in Section 107 
grants courts considerable interpretive discretion, and lawmakers have 
resisted attempts to cabin this discretion through the use of evidentiary 
presumptions.  While this interpretation of fair use leaves courts free to 
be sensitive to the nuances of any given case, leading courts and 
commentators generally acknowledge that the four-factor test as 
interpreted provides very little guidance for predicting whether a 
particular use will be deemed fair.89 
84 See Campbell, 510 U.S., at 591-592. 
85 Nunez v. Caribbean Intern. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st. Cir. 2000) (“Surely the 
market for professional photographs of models publishable only due to the controversy of 
the photograph itself is small or nonexistent.”). 
86 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
87 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994). 
88 See, e.g., Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2004); Bond v. 
Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003); Sundeman v. Seajay Society, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 206 
(4th Cir. 1998); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Camp Systems Intern., Inc., 428 F.Supp.2d 
1369, 1379 (S.D. Ga. 2006); Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F.Supp.2d 442, 
448 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Dahlen v. Michigan Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 132 F.Supp.2d 574, 587 
(E.D.Mich. 2001); see also Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(noting post-Campell lower court inconsistency in treatment of fourth factor); Beebe, supra 
note 27, at 12 (“The data suggest, however, that the factor is nearly decisive whether it tilts in 
favor of the plaintiff or the defendant—though, admittedly, slightly more so when it tilts in 
favor of the former.”). 
89 See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §13.05[A][5] at 
13-189 (2005). 
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 C. Judicial Application Adds Little Certainty 
Even when courts resist using heuristics such as evidentiary 
presumptions to identify fair uses, judicial application of an uncertain 
legal standard over time can lead to some predictability for at least a 
subset of cases.  The conundrum is that most defendants lack 
incentives to defend novel fair use interpretations.  Indeed, in the face 
of the case-specific fair use doctrine and its accompanying uncertainty, 
it is reasonable to imagine that users will hesitate to rely on fair use 
unless the risk of enforcement appears low.  Moreover, because the 
penalties for erroneously relying on fair use can be quite severe,90 even 
if users adopt a very conservative interpretation of the doctrine, we 
should expect that primarily well-resourced users would be willing to 
assert fair use rights in litigation.  Evidence of how fair use currently 
functions supports this view. 
 There are a range of cases in which the question of fair use 
recurs.  In a few settings, litigation has provided ex ante certainty 
through the emergence of soft fair use rules. The first use is reverse 
engineering of software through decompilation or disassembly of 
object code for purposes of developing competing or complementary 
entertainment products or platforms.  The courts have held that 
making an intermediate copy of a competitor’s software for purposes 
of gaining access to uncopyrightable elements is a fair use so long as 
the final product is not substantially similar to the competitor’s.91 This 
however is a narrow rule.  In related settings, fair use remains as 
uncertain as ever.92 A second soft fair use rule is that personal copying 
 
90 See supra notes XX-XX and accompanying text (discussing magnitude of penalties for 
copyright infringement). 
91 See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that intermediate copying for the purpose of reverse engineering Playstation was a fair use); 
DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Bateman 
v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 896 F. 
Supp. 1050, 1056- 57 (D. Colo. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 
1997); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (original opinion issuing 
fair use rule); see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of 
Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, pt. IV (2002) (justifying this fair use rule in terms of 
economics of reverse engineering in software industry). 
92 See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (distinguishing Sega and rejecting fair use defense because “[r]ather than 
being part of an attempt at reverse engineering, the copying appears to have been done after 
Pulsecom had determined how the system functioned and merely to demonstrate the 
interchangeability of the Pulsecom POTS cards with those made and sold by 
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for purposes of “time shifting” is fair.93 The rationale for this rule 
would extend to other forms of private copying, but litigation in 
relation to these uses is too sparse to declare the emergence of a soft 
rule.94 Similarly, it is probably the case that an Internet search engine’s 
copying of web pages for purposes of indexing is either implicitly 
licensed or is categorically fair,95 but the case law is not sufficient to 
declare it so.  Finally, the other clarifying rule is that commercial piracy 
– wholesale commercial duplication of a copyrighted work for non-
expressive purposes – is not a fair use. 96 These fair use rules, however, 
are too narrow to provide a model for fair use clarification in other 
settings. 
 Instead, in order to evaluate whether traditional litigation has 
been able to clarify the scope of fair use in the nearly 30 years since the 
1976 Act took effect, let us consider examples of each of the favored 
uses called out in Section 107’s preamble beginning with one of the 
most frequently-litigated fair uses:  parody. 97 
1. Comment or Criticism 
As a general matter, using another’s expression for purposes of 
comment or criticism often is considered a paradigmatic fair use, 
particularly when the commentary is directed at the borrowed work.98 
In addition, in cultural conversation, poking fun at, or criticizing, 
 
DSC.holding.”); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409 (S.D. 
Tex. 1995) (holding that copying software to duplicate pre-failure warning on its compatible 
hard drives not fair use). 
93 See Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of 
Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, 134-35 (2006). 
94 See id. at 135-38. 
95 Cf. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
96 See, e.g., U.S. v. Slater, 348 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2003) (no abuse of discretion in refusing 
fair use instruction in criminal trial concerning unauthorized distribution of software); 
Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir.1989) (“[W]here, as here, [defendant’s] 
use is for the same intrinsic purpose as [plaintiff's], such use seriously weakens a claimed fair 
use.”). 
97 See PATRY, FAIR USE, supra note XX, at 162-202 (discussing leading parody cases); see also 
Beebe, surpa, note XX at 5 (showing that almost 10% of district court opinions examined 
involved a claim of parody). 
98 Some such uses, such as quotations in book reviews, are recognized as fair uses and are 
therefore infrequently litigated.  There are however quantitative and qualitative limitations to 
this principle, as Harper & Row demonstrates.     
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dominant discourse is commonplace.99 One means of exercising this 
freedom is through parody and satire.  These forms of dissent 
implicate copyright law because they require borrowing dominant 
expression in order to be effective.100 Not surprisingly, copyright 
owners frequently take offense at parodic borrowings, and defendants 
frequently respond that their expression is quintessentially a fair use. 
 Some professional parodists appear comfortable relying on fair 
use, even with its context-dependent character. For example, those 
who produce and distribute comedic television programming such as 
Saturday Night Live, South Park, the Simpsons, the Daily Show, and 
the Colbert Report, routinely rely on fair use’s protection for parody. 
In the case of Saturday Night Live, for example, NBC appears willing 
to litigate the occasional legal challenge.101 In contrast, the recording 
company that represents “Weird Al” Yankovic, whose profession is to 
record parodies of popular songs along with some original 
compositions, has chosen to seek licenses and to avoid any reliance on 
fair use.102 
For those potential fair users who do not make parody a daily 
part of their business, the parody cases that have been litigated to 
judgment do not supply much in the way of general guidance.  To 
greatly simplify matters, the essential tension arises in parody cases that 
pit the defendant’s creativity in transforming the plaintiff’s work 
against the commercial nature of the defendant’s use.  If ex ante clarity 
could be had in this context, it might be supplied by a definitive ruling 
by the highest court in the land.  It appeared to some as if this had 
been delivered. 
In 1989, the rap group 2 Live Crew transformed Roy Orbison's 
"Oh, Pretty Woman" into “Big Hairy Woman,” delivering new lyrics in 
rap style over the essential musical elements of Orbison’s composition.  
 
99 See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003). 
100 See, e.g., Cambell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994); SunTrust Bank 
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001). 
101 See, e.g., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(holding that Saturday Night Live skit parodying “I Love New York” advertising jingle was 
fair use). 
102 See “Weird Al” Yankovic, The Official Website, FAQ (“Al does get permission from the 
original writers of the songs that he parodies. While the law supports his ability to parody 
without permission, he feels it's important to maintain the relationships that he's built with 
artists and writers over the years.”) at http://www.weirdal.com/faq.htm (visited Aug. 25, 
2006). 
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The group's manager requested permission to release the song from 
Acuff-Rose Music, owner of the copyright in Orbison’s musical 
work.103 Acuff-Rose refused permission, but 2 Live Crew released the 
song anyway.104 Acuff-Rose filed suit.105 Initially, 2 Live Crew took 
the position that it had made a cover version of the Orbison song 
under the statutory license for cover songs.106 The group wisely 
abandoned that defense and pinned its hopes on fair use. 
In its opinion, the Court rebuffed attempts to clarify the fair use 
inquiry in parody cases through evidentiary presumptions.  On the one 
hand, the Court declared that a commercial use could not be deemed 
presumptively unfair.107 On the other hand, the Court refused to grant 
parody a presumption of fairness, while recognizing that parody 
requires some use of its target to be effective.108 Moreover, the opinion 
introduced a material distinction between parody and satire for fair use 
purposes.109 Since the song in this case fell on the parody side of the 
divide, the case was settled on terms largely favorable to the parodists 
after remand.110 
For future cases, the Court’s emphasis on context-sensitivity 
and the interdependence of the four factors provide little hope for any 
certainty.  But, one could read the Court’s opinion to have created a 
reasonably predictable safe harbor for parody applicable at least when 
the target of the parody is the copyrighted work and when the parodist 
has not taken “too much.”  Although each of these elements also has 
 
103 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.  
104 Id. at 573 (2 Live Crew did credit the songwriters and the publisher). 
105 See Id.
106 See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1152 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev’d,
972 F.2d 1429 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d sub nom. Campell  v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 
(1994); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2004) (providing statutory license to record musical composition so 
long as essential melody and lyrics are preserved). 
107 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85. 
108 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581 (“The Act has no hint of an evidentiary preference for 
parodists over their victims, and no workable presumption for parody could take account of 
the fact that parody often shades into satire when society is lampooned through its creative 
artifacts, or that a work may contain both parodic and nonparodic elements. Accordingly, 
parody, like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be judged 
case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law.”). 
109 See id. at 590-91 (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some 
claim to use the creation of its victim's (or collective victims') imagination, whereas satire can 
stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”). 
110 See Associated Press, Acuff-Rose settles suit with rap group, MEMPH. COMMERCIAL APPEAL,
June 05, 1996, at A14. 
Vol. ##] FIXING FAIR USE 25 
Version 1.3 – November 10, 2006 
fuzzy boundaries, this rule of thumb would seem to make it easier to 
conduct ex ante fair use analysis. 
To test this hypothesis, consider how you, as legal adviser, 
would apply fair use under the following circumstances.  Your client is 
an academic press that is willing to publish the following two books 
only if in your opinion as counsel there is a 75% or better chance that a 
court would grant summary judgment in favor of fair use in the event 
that the publisher were sued.  In each case, parody would be your best 
argument.   
Book 1. The story, The Wind Done Gone, appropriates the 
characters, plot and major scenes from Margaret Mitchell’s iconic novel 
Gone with the Wind. In The Wind Done Gone, the author, an African-
American woman, tells the story of the antebellum South through the 
eyes of Cyanara, who is Scarlett O’Hara’s mixed-race half-sister and 
full-time lover of Rhett Butler.111 The significant narrative elements 
from Gone With the Wind are all transformed to dramatically alter the 
relative strengths and nuances of the African-American and white 
characters, and a number of relationships from the original have been 
reimagined.  For example, the character Ashley Wilkes, is rendered as a 
gay man.  For this reason, among others, there is no chance that the 
Mitchell estate would grant a license to publish this work.112 Is fair use 
as applied to parody sufficiently clear that you would advise your client 
to publish the book? 
Book 2.  The author has written a book entitled The Cat NOT in 
the Hat: A Parody by Dr. Juice, which tells the tale of the O.J. Simpson 
trial (non-copyrightable facts) in the style of Theodor Geisel’s (a.k.a. 
Dr. Seuss’s) Cat in the Hat. Recall that the Seuss original is a morality 
tale about a brother and sister’s mishaps when visited by the Cat in the 
Hat while their mother is away.  In the Cat NOT in the Hat, the graphic 
elements of the original are borrowed and samples of the text are as 
follows: 
 
111 See SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1268. 
112 See SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1270 n.26 (“[I]t is evident from the record evidence that 
SunTrust makes a practice of requiring authors of its licensed derivatives to make no 
references to homosexuality.”); see also id. at 1282 (Marcus, J., concurring) (arguing that 
unwillingness to license should influence fourth fair use factor). 
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A happy town  
Inside L.A.  
Where rich folks play  
The day away.  
But under the moon  
The 12th of June.  
Two victims flail  
Assault! Assail!  
Somebody will go to jail!  
Who will it be?  
Oh my! Oh me!113 
and the tale ends: 
 
JUICE  
+ST  
JUSTICE  
Hmm ... take the word JUICE.  
Then add ST.  
Between the U and I, you see.  
And then you have JUSTICE. Or maybe you don't.  
Maybe we will.  
And maybe we won't.  
'Cause if the Cat didn't do it?  
Then who? Then who?  
Was it him?  
Was it her?  
Was it me?  
Was it you?  
Oh me! Oh my!  
Oh my! Oh me!  
The murderer is running free.114 
Assume again the same conditions.  Is the parody defense sufficiently 
strong to advise publication? 
 
113See Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 
1997) (quoting original). 
114 Id. at 1402. 
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Most readers probably feel ill-equipped to answer these 
questions without seeing the entirety of the works in question – raising 
the costs of your legal advice.  After reading the full works, many 
copyright lawyers would probably conclude that the case for fair use is 
stronger for Book 1 than it is for Book 2.  But, when faced with the 
risk-averse conditions posed in the hypothetical questions, many 
copyright lawyers probably would be unwilling to give the client 
sufficient assurance for publication to go forward even after the 
Supreme Court’s Campbell opinion was handed down. 
If one reads Campbell to have provided a parody safe harbor, in 
each case, arguments can be made about both the targeting and the 
amount of borrowing.  For the first book, the case for targeting of 
Mitchell’s original is clearer, but the amount borrowed is also quite 
extensive.  In the second book, the argument for targeting is more 
strained but one can make the case that the narrative contrasts the 
relative harmlessness of Geisel’s trickster figure with a presumed-guilty 
Simpson.  In addition, the amount borrowed is relatively small.  The 
graphic character of the cat is the most significant borrowing because 
the story is comprised of public domain facts, and Geisel’s estate does 
not own a copyright in the meter of his rhymes.  Moreover, in each of 
these books, and in Campbell itself, the relationship between white and 
black Americans lurks as relevant but ambiguous consideration.  Is this 
relevant to whether “too much” has been taken?  If so, how? 
Litigation of parody cases provides some ex ante guidance about 
fair use, and it arguably has created a simplified safe harbor analysis for 
the parody context.  Even with these benefits, uncertainty remains a 
problem sufficient to chill risk-averse users such as our hypothetical 
academic press.  Indeed, we have these examples only because they are 
drawn from actual post-Campbell cases that involved commercial 
publishers with a greater tolerance for risk than was posed in the 
hypothetical. 
In the first case, Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,115 the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction that would have 
prohibited publication of The Wind Done Gone.116 The appellate court 
did not rule on the merits, but remanded with extensive analysis 
 
115 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
116 See Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 (N.D. Ga. 2001), 
vacated by, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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leaning notably in favor of defendant’s fair use defense.117 With the 
writing on the wall, the estate later settled.118 In the second, Dr. Seuss 
Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,119 the Ninth Circuit upheld a 
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the work fell on the wrong 
side of Campbell’s parody/satire distinction because the book did not 
aim its commentary or ridicule at the Dr. Seuss original.120 
If parody is the use that comes closest to having a reliable fair 
use rule of thumb announced by the court of last resort.  From the ex 
ante perspective, fair use is not working very well.  Even with this 
degree of clarity, these two cases required substantial litigation 
resources to be resolved.  As one might imagine, potential fair users 
with fewer resources and/or greater risk aversion would be far more 
likely to forgo a fair use in the face of potential litigation. 
 We have some evidence to support this theory.  In the mid-
1990s, the growth of the World Wide Web opened the gates to poorly-
financed speakers to publish parodies cheaply and easily.  However, 
legal uncertainty surrounding fair use coupled with the Copyright Act’s 
so-called notice-and-takedown regime,121 led to a retreat from reliance 
on fair use in a number of cases.  The most notable of these may be 
Mark Napier’s Distorted Barbie site in which he sought to subvert the 
cultural meaning associated with Mattel’s doll.  Mattel responded 
aggressively, and Napier relented.122 (To be clear, a few parodists have 
been willing to litigate to resist Mattel’s unreasonably aggressive 
copyright claims in relation to Barbie.123) Other evidence of aggressive 
 
117 See id., rev’g 136 F.Supp.2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
118 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Mitchell Estate Settles "Gone With the Wind" Suit, N.Y. Times, May 
10, 2002, at C6 (reporting the settlement and summarizing the case). 
119 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). 
120 See id. at 1403. 
121 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2004) (providing safe harbor to online service providers who store 
infringing material at the direction of a user subject to condition that provider remove 
material alleged to be infringing when given proper notice). 
122 See Mark Napier, Does The Distorted Barbie Violate Mattel’s Copyright? (Oct. 18, 1997) at 
http://www.detritus.net/projects/barbie/ (telling story) (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
123 See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(affirming summary judgment of fair use to photographer who depicted nude Barbies 
imperiled by household appliances), remanding to; Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain 
Productions, 2004 WL 1454100 *2 (C.D. Cal., Jun. 21, 2004) (awarding defendant 
photographer attorneys’ fees because Mattel’s copyright infringement claim was objectively 
unreasonable and was brought to force defendant into costly litigation in order to dissuade 
him from lawful use of Barbie’s image); Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F.Supp.2d 315, 321-22 
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claims against probable fair uses can be culled from the cease and 
desist letters compiled by the Chilling Effects web site,124 and from a 
recent report by Marjorie Heins and Tricia Beckles entitled Will Fair 
Use Survive?.125 Finally, to extent that the parody cases provide any 
guidance, it does not carry over to related forms of commentary.  For 
example, if the parody cases demonstrate the protection fair use 
supplies when one talks back to culture, the doctrine is far less reliable 
for those who talk about culture.126 
2. Educational Uses 
 
If the oft-litigated issue of parody remains uncertain ex ante, a 
second candidate for fair use clarity might be educational uses.  Even 
with the courts’ well-established allergy to fair use presumptions, one 
might give some weight to the fact that half of the purposes that 
Congress identified as signaling a fair use in Section 107 are education-
related: “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
 
(S.D.N.Y.2002) (denying Mattel’s motion for summary judgment because of defendant’s fair 
use defense). 
124 See www.chillingeffects.org (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
125 See generally MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, NYU 
LAW SCHOOL, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT 
CONTROL (2005) (describing results of interviews with fair users and copyright owners 
concerning disputes including those involving parodies). 
126 In a number of cases, defendants who have created derivative works based on culturally 
iconic works erroneously relied on fair use, notwithstanding the transformative nature of 
their works. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’n Int’l, 81 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that 
books about Beanie Babies that used descriptions and photos not a fair use) rev’d 292 F.3d 512 
(7th Cir. 2002) (remanding with strong suggestion that some books were entitled to fair use, 
and some not); see also Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D. Cal 
1998) (holding that book chronicling Godzilla movies not fair use); Castle Rock v. Carol 
Publ’g Group, 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that quiz book about Seinfeld 
television program not a fair use), aff’d 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Paramount Pictures 
Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that book about 
Star Trek with episode summaries and other material not a fair use); aff’d 181 F.3d 83 (2d 
Cir.1999); Twin Peaks Prod., Inc. v. Publ’n Int’l, Ltd, 778 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(holding that book about the television program Twin Peaks not a fair use), aff’d in part  996 
F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming copyright holding). 
 The courts found each of these books to endanger the copyright holder’s market 
for similar tributes to their popular characters.  See Ty, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 906; Toho, 33 F. 
Supp. at 1217-1218; Castle Rock, 955 F. Supp. at 272 (even if copyright holder likely will not 
exploit market); Paramount, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 336; Twin Peaks Prod., 778 F. Supp. at 1251. 
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scholarship, or research.”127 However, although educational purposes 
gain favor in the analysis under the first fair use factor (nature and 
purpose of use), the situation is complicated under the fourth factor 
(harm to the market) because educational publishers have developed 
markets for many educational uses of copyrighted works.  Courts faced 
with educational fair use cases have thus been conflicted about whether 
the educator’s favored purpose or the publisher’s market interest 
should prevail.128 
Nevertheless, because educators and students must use a wide 
range of resources that lie within copyright law’s domain, educational 
institutions have a strong interest in fair use clarification.  In response 
to the uncertainty this section is documenting, these institutions have 
resorted to a patchwork of strategies.  For example, in the course of 
codifying fair use in the 1976 Act, and subsequently, educational 
institutions negotiated with copyright owners, at times under the urging 
of Congress, to set forth rule-like guidelines that would establish safe 
harbors.129 These guidelines do provide clarity for a subset of 
 
127 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also Fisher, supra note XX, at 1770 (noting that “a suspicion 
persists among many students of the [fair use] doctrine that educational activities should 
stand on a somewhat different footing from other kinds of uses”). 
128 For example, in the “copy shop” cases two courts have held that a copy shop that makes 
“multiple copies for classroom use” for profit is not making a fair use of the work.Princeton 
University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996 (en 
banc); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
However, an educational institution that produces coursepacks and sells them at cost may 
well be engaged in fair use, depending upon the amount copied from each work. 
129 See generally Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001) (discussing these attempts and their drawbacks). Most of these 
attempts have resulted in fair use “guidelines.”  The most prominent of these have been:  
(1) Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit 
Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. Rep. 
No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976); see also PATRY, supra note XX, at 344-59 
(providing draft materials leading up to guidelines).  
(2) Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 70-
71 (1976). 
(3) Guidelines for Off-Air Recordings of Broadcast Programming for 
Educational Purposes, H.R. Rep. No. 97-495, at 8-9 (1982). These 
guidelines first appeared in 127 Cong. Rec. 18, at 24,048-49 (1981).  
(4) CONTU Guidelines on Photocopying Under Interlibrary Loan 
Arrangements, in National Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works, Final Report of the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, July 31, 1978 54-55. 
(5) Proposal for Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Digital Images, in 
Information Infrastructure Task Force, Working Group on Intellectual 
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educational uses, but because these guidelines serve only as a floor, 
many colorable fair uses fall outside their ambit and remain subject to 
the standard four-factor uncertainty. 
 Consequently, in higher education, university counsel and 
university librarians often must field a dizzying array of fair use 
inquiries.  Some counsel’s offices or libraries have responded with fairly 
detailed guidance available on the Web.130 Notable among these 
repsonses is the position adopted by the Office of General Counsel at 
the University of Texas, which has issued its own fair use rules of 
thumb.131 In addition, the American Library Association employs a 
 
Property Rights, Conference on Fair Use: Final Report to the 
Commissioner on the Conclusion of the Conference on Fair Use, 
November 1998 33-41.  
(6) Proposal for Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Distance Learning, in 
CONFU Final Report 43-48.  
(7) Proposal for Fair Use Guidelines for Educational Multimedia, in CONFU 
Final Report 49-59; see also Staff of House Subcomm. on Courts and 
Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., Fair 
Use Guidelines for Educational Multimedia (Comm. Print 1996). For a 
discussion of the origins of this Multimedia Committee Print and its 
relation to the CONFU Final Report, see Crews, supra, nn. 215-16; 431. 
130 See, e.g., Stanford University Libraries, Copyright & Fair Use at http://fairuse.stanford.edu/
(visited Aug. 25, 2006); Copyright Management Center, Fair Use Issues at 
http://copyright.iupui.edu/fairuse.htm (visited Aug. 25, 2006); Univeristy of Maryland 
University College, Copyright and Fair Use in the Classroom, on the Internet, and the World Wide Web 
at http://www.umuc.edu/library/copy.shtml (visited Aug. 25, 2006); American Association 
of Law Libraries, AALL Guidelines on the Fair Use of Copyrighted Works by Law Libraries at 
http://www.aallnet.org/about/policy_fair.asp (visited Aug. 25, 2006)’ see also North Carolina 
Department of Public Instruction, Copyright in an Electronic Environment (guidelines for K-12 
setting) at http://www.dpi.state.nc.us/copyright1.html (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
131 See, e.g., Office of General Counsel, University of Texas, Fair Use of Copyrighted 
Materials at http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectualProperty/copypol2.htm (visited 
Aug. 25, 2006): 
We have reviewed all the [negotiated] Guidelines and have decided to take 
a different approach to protecting our component institutions and our 
faculty, staff and students from the dangers of the no-man's land while 
supporting our exercise of fair use rights. We call our approach "Rules of 
Thumb" for the Fair Use of Copyrighted Materials. Like the Guidelines 
from which they are in some cases derived, the Rules of Thumb are 
tailored to different uses of others' works. But unlike the Guidelines, they 
are short, concise, and easy to read. And they are part of a larger strategy 
to meet our needs for permission when fair use is not enough; to reduce 
our need for permission in the future by licensing comprehensive access 
to works; and to take a more active role in the management of the 
copyrighted works created on our campuses for the benefit of our 
university community. 
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specialist responsible for fielding fair use inquiries and for providing 
general responses.  Examples of the myriad endeavors plagued by fair 
use uncertainty to which she has responded include whether creating a 
computer program that explains the answers to math book problems is 
allowed;132 whether student’s free hand drawings of copyrighted 
characters can be put into a school magazine;133 whether videotaping 
different versions of a scene from Macbeth for comparison is 
infringement;134 whether student-made videos containing commercial 
music and video clips may be shown on the schools closed-circuit 
television station,135 and whether a library can put images of covers of 
recommended book on its children’s website.136 
These issues highlight the run-of-the-mill fair use uncertainty 
that darkens campuses across the country on a daily basis.  The 
transition to a digital environment manifestly increases the expressive 
costs of this uncertainty, which now touches upon systematic uses of 
copyrighted works.  A harbinger for this development is the 
controversy that has emerged between the Association of American 
Publishers and the University of California at San Diego over the 
university’s “electronic reserve system.”137 The school has developed a 
new system through which students acquire required reserve materials 
online with a password rather than by going to the library to read 
books held on reserve.138 
The publishers believe that this practice more closely resembles 
commercial “course packs,” which courts have found to not be a fair 
use.139 The university believes that this use is the functional equivalent 
of a lawful analog use140 and that any suit by publishers would be futile 
 
132 See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright, SCHOOL LIBRARY JOURNAL, June 01, 2003, at 41 
(Carrie Russell, the American Library Association’s copyright expert answers questions on 
fair use, but states that her opinions should not be taken as legal advice). 
133 See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright, SCHOOL LIBRARY JOURNAL, Sept. 01, 2002, at 39. 
134 See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright, SCHOOL LIBRARY JOURNAL, June 01, 2003, at 35. 
135 See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright, SCHOOL LIBRARY JOURNAL, April 01, 2002, at 43. 
136 See Carrie Russell, Carrie on Copyright, SCHOOL LIBRARY JOURNAL, January 01, 2002, at 41. 
137 See Scott Carlson, Legal Battle Brews Over Availability of Texts on Online Reserve at U. of 
California Library, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Apr. 22, 2005 at 36. 
138 See id.
139 See supra note XX. 
140 Traditional course reserves rely upon the first sale doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109, and/or fair 
use to make materials available to students. The ways in which fair use must substitute for 
first sale in the digital age is an important subject that lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
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and a public-relations disaster.141 However, other institutions are less 
willing to rely on fair use for fear of litigation costs.142 A range of 
other educational fair use disputes that have arisen, or are likely to 
arise, in the digital transition are further highlighted in a recently-
released white paper: “The Digital Learning Challenge: Obstacles to 
Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital Age.”143 As 
these emerge, demand for a procedure to clarify fair use will intensify. 
 
3. News Reporting 
Finally, those engaged in news reporting face as much or more 
uncertainty as do social commentators and educational users.  News 
reporting is not entitled to a presumption of fairness, of course.144 As is 
the case with educational uses, fair use analysis must mitigate the 
tension between promoting favored uses while limiting the deleterious 
effects of such uses on markets for news items.  Whereas most 
educational institutions are organized on a not-for-profit basis, most 
news gathering and news reporting organizations are for-profit.  This 
distinction at times further complicates fair use analysis in news 
reporting cases. 
 Journalists and documentary filmmakers who have been brave 
enough to rely on fair use face sparse and somewhat inconsistent 
precedent.  To be sure, courts have been willing on occasion to find a 
journalistic use to be fair as a matter of law, particularly when the 
plaintiff seeks to use copyright law to squelch negative publicity rather 
than to directly protect an economic interest.145 On the other hand, in 
several cases, courts have found that using copyrighted material in 
news reports or articles is not fair use, finding that news organizations 
 
141 See Carlson, supra note XX, at 36. 
142 See id. (quoting Jonathan Franklin, fair use scholar and associate law librarian at the 
University of Washington).  
143 Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School, The Digital Learning 
Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital Age (Aug. 2006) at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/projects/education (visited Aug. 25, 2006). [Disclosure:  
I was a consultant for the project that produced this paper.] 
144 See, e.g., Nunez v. Caribbean Intern. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2000) (no 
presumption in favor of news reporting). 
145 See, e.g., Payne v. The Courier-Journal, 2006 WL 2075345 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished 
opinion affirming holding that newspaper’s quotations from unpublished children’s book in 
connection with author’s subsequent imprisonment for rape was fair use). 
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are commercial entities who have harmed he copyright holder’s market 
for the material.146 
For example, the odd career of the videotaped beating of 
Reginald Denny during the Los Angeles riots of 1992 highlights the 
uncertainty fair use poses for television news.  The fair use defense 
failed for use of the video clip without permission for purposes of 
news reporting of the event by competing news outlets.147 However, 
use of the video in connection with news reporting of the attackers’ 
trial was deemed fair.148 (Postings of the video on the YouTube 
website have drawn a new lawsuit, but this issue of fair use is unlikely 
to be litigated.149)
Documentary film can also be a form of news reporting.  
Broadcasters and film distributors have greater lead time to evaluate 
fair use with this form of reportage than do those who report the daily 
news.  This lead time appears to work against the role of fair use, 
however, because gatekeepers routinely demand clearance for most or 
all uses of copyrighted works without engaging in fair use analysis.150 
Professors Pat Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi report in Untold 
Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary 
 
146 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding 
that The Nation’s “scooping” of Time magazine’s exclusive right to first publish President 
Ford’s memoir not a fair use);  Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc, 166 
F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that translating Japanese news articles into “abstracts” which 
were then sold not a fair use); Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broad. Cos., 
Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 60 n. 6 (2d Cir.1980); Richard Feiner & Co., Inc, v. H.R. Indus., 10 
F.Supp.2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding the use of a single still of copyrighted movie in 
article not fair use) rev’d on other grounds 182 F.3d 901 (Table) (2d Cir. 1999). 
147 L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd. 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
Reuters distribution of copies of copyrighted Reginald Denny beating video to subscribers 
not fair use); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that showing Reginald Denny video on news without license was not fair use). 
148 See L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that use of 
brief Denny beating clips to promote coverage of attackers’ trial is a fair use). 
149 See Greg Sandoval, YouTube Sued Over Copyright Infringement, CNet News, Jul. 18, 2006, at 
http://news.com.com/YouTube+sued+over+copyright+infringement/2100-1030_3-
6095736.html?tag=nl (visited Aug. 25, 2006).  Although YouTube could conceivably raise a 
fair use defense, almost certainly the primary issue will be whether YouTube fits within the 
remedial safe harbor set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) for online service providers that store 
copyrighted material at the direction of a user. 
150 See generally KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, BOUND BY LAW (2006) 
(using format of graphic novel to explain difficulties faced by documentarians in clearing 
rights and obstacles to exercising fair use rights), available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/comics/digital.html (visited Nov 1, 2006). 
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Filmmakers,151 that a number of documentary filmmakers have been 
chilled in their expressive choices by an inability to rely upon their fair 
use rights.  A few samples include the following fair use quotations 
from their report: 
 
When Linda Goode Bryant was working on Flag Wars, a
documentary chronicling conflict between African-
Americans and newly-arrived gay and lesbians in a 
gentrifying  area, she had to sacrifice a scene involving a 
principal character, Linda Mitchell. Mitchell was singing 
along with the radio while painting her front porch. To 
ensure the clip could be included in the film, Bryant 
attended a producer’s academy sponsored jointly by 
POV [Point of View] and WGBH in Boston on the 
subject of music rights. The lawyer there assured her that 
such a situation “shouldn’t be a problem. But in reality, it 
seems that there is a problem, because we met the 
criteria [cited by the PBS lawyer to be able to claim fair 
use] with the Linda Mitchell moment and we had to cut 
her out [anyway].” After consulting with public TV 
documentary series POV staffers and Sony, the music 
publisher, the consensus was that ultimately the 
musician/songwriter would be uncooperative and to just 
cut the scene. “It was a shame, because it was a moment 
which really showed an aspect of her character which 
was important.”152 
. . . .
“I haven’t used fair use in the last ten years, because 
from the point of view of any broadcast or cable 
network, there is no such thing as fair use,” said Jeffrey 
Tuchman.  “I’m not speaking here of news networks. 
Every headline I use, even historical headline, even 
without news photographs, even without the masthead, 
 
151 See http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/index.htm
152 Id. at 18. 
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every magazine cover, I have to get the rights to. . . . . 
Everyone is fearful of rights issues on every level.”153 
“If you’re doing a feature DVD or for theaters, you can’t 
invoke fair use,” said Robert Stone. “Or that is, you can 
say whatever you want, but at the end of the day you 
can’t sell your film—the corporations and the lawyers 
define what the terms are.”154 
D. Absence of Procedures to Clarify Fair Use 
 
The uncertainty that prevails even in litigated settings makes the 
costs and risks associated with relying on the fair use doctrine 
problematic for many users. Enforcement strategies have intensified 
the pressure.  For example, in some industries, customs and trade 
practices once recognized certain kinds of uses as fair, supplying 
sufficient certainty to exercise fair use rights for commercial works.155 
That has now changed.  Legal departments and licensing agents in 
companies with large portfolios of copyrighted works have discarded 
old understandings.156 In the atmosphere of fear and greed that the 
advent of new production and distribution technologies has bred, legal 
departments in media companies, once seen only as cost centers, have 
tried to turn themselves into revenue centers by threatening copyright 
litigation in order to extract licensing revenues from the targets of such 
threats.157 Nowhere has this trend been more noticeable than in the 
music and film industries.158 
From the perspective of expressive freedom, the response to 
this new aggression has not been encouraging. In a few cases, strong 
lawyers are willing to advise that a contemplated use is likely to be 
judged fair, or artists are willing to proceed from a fair use position.159 
In the main, however, lawyers are unwilling or unable to provide 
 
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 5-6; AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 31, at 24. 
156 See HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 5-6. 
157 See, e.g., id.; see also Patry & Posner, supra note 23, at 1646-47 (casting this change in 
enforcement strategy more as a defensive move in response to uncertainty). 
158 See HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 5 (describing rise of clearance culture in music 
and film industries). 
159 See id. at 5-6. 
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sufficient assurance or clients are unwilling or financially unable to risk 
proceeding from a fair use position.160 Making matters worse is a 
situation roughly analogous to that posed by Arrow’s information 
paradox:161 a potential fair user who seeks to acquire better 
information about the risks of relying on fair use by asking the 
copyright owner whether it would be willing to grant permission or a 
royalty-based license for the contemplated use thereby compromises 
his or her fair use position.162 As a result, potential fair users generally 
choose between suffering expressive harms by forgoing their desired 
uses or acquiescing in licensing demands that further goad aggressive 
 
160 See id. at 46-51 (documenting cases of chilled fair use). 
161 Arrow’s information paradox is that information cannot be evaluated by a potential buyer 
until it is disclosed, but disclosure destroys the buyer’s motivation to pay because he or she 
already has acquired it. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
FACTORS 609, 614-16 (Richard R. Nelson, ed., 1962). 
162 The fair use conundrum is only a rough analogy because asking for a license prejudices 
but does not destroy the user’s fair use case. Cf. Gibson, supra note XX, at 10-13 (reviewing 
law and commentary on when a foregone license counts as harm to market). The prejudice 
to the fair use case may not be self-evident.  If the copyright owner refuses categorically to 
negotiate a license, the case for fair use may be strengthened.  See SunTrust, 268 F.3d at 1282 
(Marcus, J., concurring) (arguing that unwillingness to license should influence fourth fair 
use factor).  
 However, if the copyright owner is willing to quote a price or at least enter into 
negotiations, this fact could influence a court’s harm-to-the-market, inquiry.  See, e.g.,
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting fair use 
defense for selective photocopying of science journal articles on grounds that journal 
publishers had created a licensing market for such photocopying); Office of Legal Counsel, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Whether And Under What Circumstances Government 
Reproduction Of Copyrighted Materials Is A Noninfringing "Fair Use" Under Section 107 
Of The Copyright Act Of 1976 (Apr. 30, 1999) available at 1999 WL 33490240 (O.L.C.): 
[I]f government agencies routinely agree to pay licensing fees to engage in 
photocopying practices that were fair uses at the time, there is a chance 
some courts may conclude that a growing or longstanding custom of 
paying such fees weighs against a finding that such photocopying 
practices are fair uses when unlicensed. Thus, an agency that decides to 
negotiate a photocopying license should seek to limit the scope of the 
licensing agreement so as not to cover those photocopying practices that 
the agency, in good faith, concludes are not infringing. 
Moreover, although intent is not formally an element of fair use analysis, as a 
practical matter, it often is.  See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478-79 
(2d Cir. 2004); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d 1992); Fisher v. Dees, 794 
F.2d 432, 436-38 (9th Cir. 1986); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line 
Commun. Servs., Inc., 923, F. Supp. 1231, 1244 n. 14 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Shady 
Records, Inc. v. Source Enter., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26143 at **60-62 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005). 
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legal and licensing departments into making license demands for fair 
uses. 
 If post hoc litigation is too risky, one might ask whether some 
form of anticipatory adjudication might be available to a determined 
fair user. In contemporary copyright law, the principal procedure 
available is a suit for a declaratory judgment.  This option is subject to 
stringent limitations.  The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over copyright claims.163 Article III of the U.S. Constitution164 and the 
federal Declaratory Judgment Act165 require a case or controversy to 
have arisen for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction.  As a 
practical matter, the declaratory judgment route is available to a fair 
user only after a user has made an investment in use of the copyrighted 
work and is preparing to distribute it publicly and when a copyright 
owner has made a sufficiently specific and credible threat of 
litigation.166 
Potential fair users who seek ex ante guidance through a 
declaratory judgment proceeding are likely to find this approach 
unavailing.  For example, a group calling itself the Ad-Hoc Committee 
for the Investigation and Exposé of Multiculturalism sought to publish 
and distribute a parody of a group of works by author and poet Haki 
Madhubuti.167 The Committee sent letters of inquiry along with a copy 
of its parody to Madhubuti and to publishers of the relevant works 
seeking their acknowledgement that the contemplated parody would be 
a fair use or would otherwise be permissible.  The recipients did not to 
respond.  The Committee filed for a declaratory judgment arguing that 
silence was an intentional act “to exploit the chilling effect of the 
Copyright Act.”168 Unsurprisingly, the court dismissed the case for lack 
of jurisdiction.169 
163 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 
164 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2 (extending federal judicial power to a range of cases and 
controversies). 
165 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 
166 See, e.g., Diagnostic Unit Inmate Council v. Films, Inc., 88 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(setting forth declaratory judgment standard for copyright cases); see also Clean Flicks of 
Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp.2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (declaratory judgment 
case involving works already created and distributed). 
167 See Ad Hoc Committee for Investigation and Exposé of Multiculturalism v. Madhubuti, 
No. 93 C 1354, 1993 WL 75103 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993). 
168 Id. at *2 (quoting complaint). 
169 See id. 
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* * * * *
In sum, fair use plays an essential role in brokering expressive 
freedoms among first-generation authors and their successors in 
theory, but in practice, fair use is broken.  The high costs associated 
with interpreting standards and the financial risks associated with 
relying of fair use greatly limit the degree to which those who produce 
works for public consumption are willing to rely on fair use. 
 
II. FIXING FAIR USE: A PROPOSAL 
Copyright law must adjust to the new reality by supplying 
copyright owners with sufficient means to enforce their rights against 
commercial piracy while securing to users their necessary freedoms to 
use the copyrighted works of others under certain circumstances. 
Regrettably, copyright law currently is not up to the task.  The time has 
come to fix fair use.   There are four options for overcoming the 
problems caused by fair use uncertainty:  (1) reduce the costs of 
obtaining a fair use determination ex ante under the current legal 
standard; (2) reduce the ex post penalties for misjudging fair use in good 
faith; (3) sharpen the fuzzy edges of the doctrine by establishing 
clearly-delineated safe harbors or by making the entire doctrine more 
rule-like; or (4) implement a combination of these measures.  
 This Article argues that the first approach is best, and this 
section advances a legislative proposal to achieve ex ante fair use 
clarification through administrative adjudication.  After introducing the 
proposal, this section shows how it would greatly improve the 
functioning of copyright law and then responds to the likely legal and 
policy arguments that would be advanced in opposition. 
 
A. Description of Proposal 
 
Congress should extend the advisory opinion function available 
in other bodies of federal law to copyright law by amending the 
Copyright Act to create a Fair Use Board in the U.S. Copyright Office 
analogous to the recently-created Copyright Royalty Board.170 Fair Use 
 
170 See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b). Under the Act, the Copyright Royalty Judges will conduct 
proceedings to “make determinations and adjustments of reasonable terms and rates of 
royalty payments as provided in [Copyright Act] sections 112(e), 114, 115, 116, 118, 119 and 
1004,“ ”to make determinations concerning the adjustment of the copyright royalty rates 
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Judges would have the authority and the obligation to consider 
petitions for a fair use ruling on a contemplated or actual use of a 
copyrighted work. The copyright owner would receive notice of the 
petition and would have the opportunity to participate in the 
proceeding. 
 If the Fair Use Judge determines that such a use is or would be 
a fair use, the petitioner and the petitioner’s heirs or assigns, would be 
immune from liability for copyright infringement for such use.  Such a 
ruling would not affect the copyright owner’s rights and remedies with 
respect to any other parties or any other uses of the copyrighted work 
by the petitioner.  If the Judge rules that such use is not, or would not 
be, a fair use, the petitioner retains all other defenses to copyright 
infringement. In either case, the Judge’s determination would be 
administratively reviewable by the Register of Copyrights.171 The 
Register’s decisions would be reviewable de novo in the federal circuit 
courts of appeals. 
 
1. The Fair Use Board  
a. Selection and Composition  
The Fair Use Board should initially be comprised of a Chief 
Judge and two associate judges.  The Board’s composition could then 
be adjusted with experience.  As is the case with Copyright Royalty 
Judges, members of the Fair Use Board should be appointed by the 
Librarian of Congress in consultation with the Register of Copyrights.  
Ideally, Fair Use Judges would be impartial, efficient, and wise.  
However, impartiality will be difficult to achieve.  As a practical matter, 
members of the Fair Use Board should be lawyers with demonstrated 
 
under [Copyright Act] section 111,” to authorize distributions under sections 111, 119, and 
1007 of the Act, and “[t]o determine the status of a digital audio recording device or a digital 
audio interface device under sections 1002 and 1003, as provided in section 1010.”  Id. 
Under the Reform Act, three permanent Copyright Royalty Judges are to be 
appointed by the Librarian of Congress to encourage settlements and, when necessary, 
resolve statutory license disputes. “The expectation is that the Copyright Royalty Judges, 
appointed to staggered, six-year terms, will provide greater decisional stability, yielding the 
advantages of the former Copyright Royalty Tribunal, but with greater efficiency and 
expertise.” 37 C.F.R.  ch. III §; 70 Fed. Reg. 30901 (May 31, 2005). 
171 Cf. The Register “may review for legal error the resolution by the Copyright Royalty 
Judges of a material question of substantive law under this title that underlies or is contained 
in a final determination of the Copyright Royalty Judges.” 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(D). 
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experience in copyright law.  The requirement of prior experience with 
copyright law generally will mean that applicants will have represented 
primarily copyright owners, which will skew their understanding of the 
scope of fair use. 
 This is an unavoidable feature of this proposal.  Even with a 
cramped understanding of fair use, members of the Fair Use Board will 
be obliged to rule against some of the blatant overreaching by 
copyright owners that has become increasingly common.172 A related 
risk is the ever-present problem of the revolving door.  Fair Use Judges 
with an eye toward returning to practice will have strong incentives to 
render rulings favorable to copyright owners.  To minimize this risk, I 
propose that Fair Use Judges agree to serve for 5-year renewable terms 
subject to review.  Fair Use Judges would be subject to dismissal only 
for cause.  As part of the renewal procedure, the public would be 
invited by notice to comment on a Judge’s impartiality and 
productivity.  Given the experimental nature of this proposal, Congress 
should include a sunset provision to induce legislative review at the end 
of the first decade.173 
b. Administrative Procedures 
Congress should delegate to the Copyright Office authority to 
establish such procedures as it sees fit, subject to relatively brief 
legislative guidance.  This guidance should contain three essential 
requirements.  First, a fair use petitioner should be required to serve 
notice on the copyright owner, if the owner can be found by a good 
faith search.  Second, the copyright owner should have a full 
opportunity to participate and to contest the petition.  Third, the 
record of a proceeding before the Fair Use Board should be restricted 
to a paper record, analogous to that used by ICANN’s Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy for trademark disputes concerning domain 
names.174 Subject to these conditions, and with the benefit of notice 
 
172 See HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 33-36 (documenting overreaching cease-and-
desist letters issued by copyright owners). 
173 I was persuaded to add this provision to the proposal by Jessica Litman.  See also Jacob E. 
Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2006) (arguing in favor of 
sunset provisions). 
174 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Rules for Uniform Dispute 
Resolution Policy (Aug. 26, 1999) at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-
rules.htm#5biv (prescribing process for creating paper record). 
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and comment, the Copyright Office would be tasked to balance 
substantive and procedural fairness with efficiency. 
 I suggest the following procedural outline to give the reader a 
sense for how this proposal might be implemented.  A proceeding 
would commence when a potential fair user files a Fair Use Petition 
with the Copyright Office and certifies that such petition has been 
served upon the copyright owner(s), if known.175 Close attention 
should be paid to the appropriate filing fee, which will serve as a 
measure of the option value of a fair use ruling.176 Ideally, this system 
would be self-funding, but it would also be critical to ensure equitable 
access for poorly-resourced petitioners.  Price discrimination in the 
form of either a sliding scale or some form of in forma pauperis filing 
would be a desirable means to achieve this end. 
 The copyright owner would have a choice of two procedural 
responses.  Under the first, the owner could terminate the 
administrative process by filing suit for declaratory judgment in the 
case of a proposed use or for copyright infringement in the case of an 
existing use. Certain safeguards surrounding the timing of such filing 
and conditions under which such a suit should be dismissed without 
prejudice would be put in place to penalize use of the option in bad 
faith. 
 Alternatively, under the administrative process, the copyright 
owner would have 10 working days to give notice of intent to 
participate, and another 20 days to file any such response. The 
petitioner would be given the option to reply within 7 days.  The Fair 
 
175 In the event that the petitioner cannot identify or locate the copyright owner(s), the 
petitioner would be required to describe in detail the efforts made to find the copyright 
owner(s).  The current proceeding concerning “orphan works,” see supra note 17 and 
accompanying text, likely will result in procedures along these lines and should be 
incorporated into the proposed procedure as appropriate. 
 In addition, it might be wise to require the petitioner to certify that he or she has 
contacted the copyright owner to seek acquiescence, permission, or a license prior to filing 
with the Copyright Office.  Such a requirement could help avert needless litigation but could 
also open the opportunity for undesirable strategic behaviors.  I propose not making this a 
requirement initially, but this possibility should be the subject of study by the Copyright 
Office.  
176 See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law,
55 AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006) (discussing the ways in which filing fees and eligibility 
requirements serve as real options that filter the allocation of intellectual property rights); see 
also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 235 (2003) (discussing filtering effects of copyright 
registration fees, which climbed from $10 to $20 in 1991, to $30 in 2000, and now are $45). 
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Use Judge would have discretion to grant reasonable extensions.  Of 
course, the absence of the copyright owner would not result in a 
default judgment.  The Fair Use Judge would be obliged to make an 
independent fair use assessment.  The Fair Use Judge would have a 
deadline, perhaps 45 days after the petition and any response from the 
copyright owner has been filed, to issue a brief, written decision. 
 This decision would be non-precedential insofar as a favorable 
fair use ruling would insulate only the petitioner from liability for the 
use described in the petition.  However, the Fair Use Judge’s decision 
would be published on the Copyright Office website to assist the 
public in monitoring the Fair Use Board’s performance.  The petitioner 
or the copyright owner would have a right to seek review from the 
Register of Copyrights, who would have 10 days to decide whether to 
review the decision.  If the Register declines review, the Fair Use 
Judge’s decision would become final agency action.  If the Register 
grants review, she will have 30 days in which to issue a decision. 
 In my view the goal should be a procedure that would not 
require a petitioner or a copyright owner to be represented by counsel 
to achieve substantively just outcomes.  Because both petitioners and 
copyright owners may have an interest in being represented, however, I 
would propose that in addition to counsel the Copyright Office permit 
registered “copyright agents,” analogous to patent agents, to represent 
parties before the agency.  I envision that these agents would be 
paraprofessionals who are or have become familiar with fair use 
analysis.  Such agents could be required to pass a competence 
examination or they could self-certify under oath that they possess 
minimum competence and character qualifications. 
 
c. Administrative Record 
The petition would consist of a copy of the copyright owner’s 
work and either a copy of the petitioner’s work, if already created, or a 
detailed description of the petitioner’s proposed fair use. Any 
testimony would be in affidavit form, including any expert testimony 
on the effect on the copyright owner’s market under the fourth fair use 
factor.177 Although one can imagine a number of reasons for why a 
live evidentiary hearing with cross-examination would be desirable, the 
 
177 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing factor four). 
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stakes are limited enough that the benefits of a streamlined procedure 
outweigh the costs of any erroneous determinations that the 
streamlined procedures cause.178 
2. Judicial Review 
Judicial review of the Copyright Office’s fair use determinations 
will serve as an important check on legal errors.  Under this proposal, a 
Fair Use Ruling would be subject to review in any federal circuit court 
of appeals.  The court’s standard of review should be de novo for three 
reasons.  First, the record before the court will be identical to that 
before the Board.  Under such circumstances, the court would be the 
more appropriate body to determine which inferences may be drawn 
from the record and to resolve any credibility issues raised by the 
parties.179 Second, deference to the agency’s expertise would be 
inappropriate in these circumstances.  The proposal would be a limited 
delegation from Congress to the Copyright Office to make individual 
fair use determinations, but the power to make generally binding 
interpretations of the law would remain with the federal courts.180 
Indeed, the Fair Use Board would be obliged to apply judicial fair use 
precedent to the extent that it can be applied.181 It would therefore be 
inappropriate for an appellate court to defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of judicial precedent.  Finally, as has been observed, fair 
use now serves as one of copyright law’s “built-in free speech 
safeguards.”182 The Supreme Court has noted in analogous 
circumstances that de novo appellate review is appropriate when 
constitutional interests are at stake.183 
178 See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (discussing why Due Process Clause would 
not require evidentiary hearing). 
179 Cf. Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 
2006) (standard of review is de novo when reviewing summary judgment ruling on fair use). 
180 Cf. Bonneville Intern. Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 490 n.9 (3d Cir. 2003) (two judges on 
panel would have ruled that Copyright Office interpretation of sound recording statutory 
license not entitled to substantial deference because Congress had not shifted interpretive 
authority from the courts to the agency). 
181 See supra Section I (describing difficulty of acquiring guidance from fair use precedent).  
182 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
183 Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (independent 
appellate review is necessary when issue is mixed question of fact and law regarding 
availability of First Amendment privilege); see also Brett McDonnell & Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom Of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L. J. 2431 (1998) 
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B. Benefits of the Proposal 
This proposal will fix fair use in three ways.  First, fair use will 
become available to users for whom it is currently not an option.  This 
group includes poorly-financed potential fair users who currently must 
sacrifice their expressive freedom in the face of increasingly aggressive 
and unreasonable demands from powerful copyright owners.184 This 
group also includes creators such as literary authors, illustrators, and 
filmmakers whose opportunities to exercise their fair use rights are 
overly circumscribed by the clearance culture that predominates among 
risk-averse intermediaries.  
For example, under this proposal, documentary filmmakers 
would be able to rely upon fair use so long as their production schedule 
permits the time necessary for the process envisioned herein to run.  
The reason that the proposal will come to these creators’ aid is that 
intermediaries should accord a favorable fair use ruling the same weight 
as a license from the copyright owner.185 Even if they do not – 
because there may be a legally significant gap between the proposed 
and actual use – the added certainty of a fair use ruling ought to be 
sufficient to make reliance upon it an insurable risk.  The benefits of 
enabling fair use flow not only to the creators but also to their 
audiences. 
Moreover, as the body of non-precedential, but educational, fair 
use rulings grow, relying on fair use may become an insurable risk in 
related circumstances.  A strong impetus toward a permission culture is 
the absence of insurance for commercial distributors who may 
otherwise be inclined to rely on a creator’s fair use judgment or to 
make their own.186 In many, but not all, cases that position is a 
reasonable response to the legal uncertainty that fair use poses in its 
currently enfeebled state.  To the extent that Fair Use Rulings, and 
judicial review thereof, will improve legal certainty, as has happened 
with reverse engineering of software for purposes of interoperability, it 
 
(arguing that Bose requires independent appellate review in copyright cases that turn on 
substantial similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works).  
184 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (describing increase in copyright owner 
aggression). 
185 See id. (describing copyright clearance culture in film and music industries). 
186 See id. (explaining reasons for rise of clearance culture); see also AOKI, BOYLE & JENKINS,
supra note XX, at 52-55. 
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would be reasonable to expect to see insurance companies offer fair 
use riders to standard errors and omissions policies.187 The availability 
of such insurance should lead the legal departments of large 
commercial distributors to take a more pragmatic approach to whether 
reliance on fair use would be acceptable. 
Finally, it is important to anticipate likely dynamic consequences 
that would follow from creation of a Fair Use Board.  Two 
consequences are likely to be particularly beneficial.  First, licensing 
discussions should become more productive.  The threat of 
administrative fair use adjudication would redistribute the balance of 
bargaining power in some measure, and this should increase the range 
of an aggressive copyright owner’s zone of possible agreement.  
Relatedly, when a potential fair user evaluates whether to seek a license 
or to pursue a fair use ruling, the user will still face some uncertainty 
about whether his or her desired use would be judged a fair use.  This 
would lead the user to be interested in a license to resolve that 
uncertainty and, possibly, to acquire a degree of freedom in altering the 
scope of a proposed use.188 
If implemented, the proposal also would provide a focal point 
for public discussion of the critical role that fair use plays in the 
creative spheres.  Through such discussion, certain members of the 
public will be surprised to learn about the limits of their fair use rights 
and the reasons therefor.  To the extent that there are infringing uses 
thought to be fair by some user groups, educating those users about 
the limited scope of fair use will force them and the public to confront 
why copyright policy is what it is.  If the absence of fair use is 
materially deleterious, these users may be inspired to seek legislative 
change.189 
Fair use rulings also are likely to increase public awareness of 
increasing aggression of some copyright owners.  It will be particularly 
beneficial for appellate courts to have access to this information 
because currently they rarely hear cases involving gross overreaching 
due to the limited resources and limited political will of the victims of 
 
187 See HEINS & BECKELS, supra note 29, at 5 (describing one insurance broker’s view of 
conditions for fair use rider).  
188 Recall that a favorable fair use ruling would insulate the petitioner from liability only for 
the proposed use as detailed in the petition.  
189 Cf. Wendy Gordon, Fair Use:  Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903, 904 
(2005) (“In the legislative domain, conceivably fair use is a false promise that keeps the 
public from demanding, or Congress from providing, limits on copyright.”). 
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such aggression.190 It is my prediction that appeals from adverse fair 
use rulings would reaffirm for the appellate courts the importance of 
striking the appropriate balance between copyright owners and those 
who seek to express themselves with the aid of words, images, 
melodies, or sounds created by others. 
 
C. On the Legality and Desirability of the Proposal 
Implementing the proposal would benefit fair users, copyright 
owners interested in legal certainty, and the general public, but some 
interested parties and commentators are likely to raise legal and policy 
objections.  This subsection anticipates and responds to the most likely 
of these. 
 
1. Constitutional Challenges to the Fair Use Board 
 
Opponents of this proposal are likely to challenge its lawfulness, 
arguing that it violates three provisions of constitutional law:  (1) the 
doctrine of separation of powers; (2) the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause;191 and (3) the Article III case-or-controversy 
requirement.192 It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully brief each 
of these issues.  Instead, this subsection identifies the key points that 
must be addressed, and sketches in the reasons why each of these 
challenges should fail. 
 
a. Separation of Powers 
 
In any other context, this proposal to extend the institutional 
straddle of anticipatory adjudication already implemented in a number 
of areas of federal law would raise no constitutional flags and would be 
treated as standard matter of administrative law.  However, this 
proposal could well draw a constitutional challenge because of the 
status of the Copyright Office. 
 
190 Cf. Noam Scheiber, The Hustler, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2006, (describing how 
Thomas Goldstein’s appellate advocacy has persuaded the Supreme Court to hear an 
increasing number of cases involving less wealthy parties) reprinted at 
http://www.tnr.com/doc_posts.mhtml?i=20060410&s=scheiber041006 [Law & Society 
cite?] 
191 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
192 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2. 
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The proposal would permit officers employed by an arm of 
Congress to have the power to declare the rights of two or more 
private parties under the Copyright Act, subject to review by an Article 
III court.  The Copyright Office is part of the Library of Congress.193 
The Register of Copyrights is appointed by the Librarian of Congress 
and is under the Librarian's supervision.194 While the Librarian of 
Congress is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of 
the Senate,195 the Library, as its name suggests, is organized under Title 
Two of the United States Code, which governs Congress.196 
An opponent would argue that the proposal violates the 
doctrine of separation of powers by granting an arm of Congress the 
right to exercise executive power reserved to the President.  According 
to this argument, Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the 
power only to legislate, with certain explicit exceptions, and legislation 
requires bicameralism and presentment.197 Relatedly, the power to 
execute the laws cannot be exercised by either Congress or an officer 
under its control.198 
The short response is that this argument has force only to the 
extent that a court would be attracted to deploy formalist rather than 
functionalist separation-of-powers analysis with respect to this 
proposal.199 One cannot completely discount this risk because some 
jurists are ideologically disposed toward formalist constitutional 
interpretation as a general principle. But in the main this proposal 
differs materially from the kinds of legislation that has attracted a 
formalist response from the Court.  Unlike cases that prompt such a 
response, this proposal does not have any feature that could be 
 
193 See 17 U.S.C. § 701. 
194 17 U.S.C. § 701(a).  
195 2 U.S.C. § 136. 
196 See 2 U.S.C., ch. 5 (Library of Congress). 
197 See id. at 954-955 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House power to initiate 
impeachment); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (Senate power to conduct impeachment trials); 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Senate power to approve presidential appointments, and to 
ratify treaties)). 
198 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating the portion of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act which delegated supervisory duties to the Comptroller General, a 
congressional officer). 
199 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and Constitutional Theory:  Bowls and Plateaus 
in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 581, 582-85 (1992) (describing and analyzing 
standard account of formalist and functionalist approaches to separation of powers 
disputes). 
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characterized as a legislative usurpation of executive or judicial power. 
No executive agency is charged with the duty of implementing the 
Copyright Act, and Congress has not sought to insulate Copyright 
Office decisions from judicial review. 
Moreover, in recent years, Congress has delegated increasing 
authority to the Copyright Office.  Most notably, the Librarian of 
Congress has power to declare certain provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act inapplicable to classes of work so 
designated by the Librarian after notice-and-comment rulemaking.200 
Although commentators have flagged the risk, the constitutionality of 
the provision has not been challenged.201 Indeed, when courts have 
reviewed Copyright Office interpretations of the Copyright Act, they 
have applied standard administrative law principles as if the Office 
were an executive agency.202 Consequently, there is little judicial 
precedent to support the separation-of-powers challenge to this 
proposal and no feature of it likely to cause a moderate jurist concern 
for the integrity of the constitutional scheme. 
 
b. Due Process 
Some critics might argue that the proposal would deny the 
copyright owner due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  
These critics would have to concede that the proposal provides the 
standard due process components: notice, an opportunity to be heard, 
an unbiased decisionmaker,203 and a written decision on the record.  
Their argument would be limited to whether the opportunity to be 
heard was adequate because the question of fair use would be 
determined in the absence of a full evidentiary hearing. 
 
200 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D). 
201 See Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use 
Survive, 21 E.I.P.R. 236, 238 (1999). 
202 See, e.g., Universal City Studios LLLP v. Peters, 402 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(applying rule that agency’s interpretation of its own rules entitled to substantial deference); 
Bonneville Intern. Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 2003) (choosing not to decide 
what level of deference appropriate under standard administrative law principles concerning 
scope of legislative delegation); Satellite Broadcasting and Comm. Ass'n of America v. 
Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 347 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The Copyright Office is a federal agency with 
authority to promulgate rules concerning the meaning and application of § 111.”). 
203 Although there are structural reasons to believe that members of the Fair Use Board 
would be pre-disposed against broad interpretations of fair use, see supra Section II.A.1.a, this 
form of pre-disposition does not amount to bias under the Due Process Clause. 
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A court would assess whether due process requires an 
evidentiary hearing for non-binding, anticipatory adjudication of fair 
use by applying the balancing framework established by Matthews v. 
Eldridge.204 The court must assess: 
 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.205 
Under each factor, the balance favors the proposal.  First, the 
private interest at stake is narrow because the scope of a Fair Use 
Ruling is limited to whether a particular user’s use of the work is fair.  
The copyright owner retains the right to relitigate the issue against any 
other user. 
Second, the risk of an erroneous fair use judgment is minimal.  
A cynic might quip that the fair use standard is so indeterminate that 
one cannot identify a determination that is legally erroneous, but that 
argument reaches too far.  Instead, while close cases will generate 
significant differences of opinion, there are a range of decision points 
that most would recognize as being within the zones of correctness and 
error.  However, the risk of error caused by reliance on a written 
record is low because the most important evidence to the legal 
determination is the comparison of the owner’s and the user’s works.  
For that reason, fair use is frequently determined as a matter of law.206 
204 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (discussing the various factors and 
considerations relevant to ascertaining the minimum process due before government 
implements a decision burdening a liberty or property interest); see also Henry J. Friendly, 
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (cataloguing and discussing various 
procedural requirements that a reviewing court might deem procedural due process to 
require, and engaging in a cost/benefit analysis of each procedure); see also 
205 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
206 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“Although the issue of fair use is a mixed question of law and fact, the court may 
resolve issues of fair use at the summary judgment stage where there are no genuine issues of 
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A critic might argue that witness credibility is material to 
determinations of the user’s intent or the copyright owner’s assertions 
regarding harm to actual or potential markets and that this credibility 
requires a live evidentiary hearing.  However, by conditioning the Fair 
Use Board’s decision upon the facts asserted in the written record, 
either the user or the copyright owner could argue that the Board 
decision does not apply to an actual use if the facts can be proven to be 
significantly different than were asserted in the administrative record. 
As important, the copyright owner would have the opportunity to opt 
out of the administrative proceeding by filing suit in federal district 
court, where a full evidentiary hearing would be available.207 For this 
reason, little value should be assigned to a requirement of an 
evidentiary hearing in all cases when such a hearing is available as an 
option. 
Finally, requiring a full evidentiary hearing would be nearly fatal 
to the proposal.  The government’s interest in giving access to fair use 
to those who cannot otherwise afford it for reasons of time or financial 
resources while preserving the copyright owner’s ability to manage her 
own assets depends upon a streamlined procedure.  In other 
procedural due process cases, the government’s interest in expediency 
is, and should be, outweighed by the substantiality of the private 
interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest.  Here, 
however, where the issue to be decided by the Fair Use Board is quite 
narrow, and the value of requiring an evidentiary hearing would do 
little to minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation while significantly 
undermining the government’s interest in creating and administering 
the Fair Use Board’s procedures, the balance favors the procedures as 
outlined in this proposal.  
 
material fact as to such issues.”); Beebe, supra note 27, noting that fair use was decided on 
summary judgment in a substantial minority of cases. 
207 In theory, a fair use petitioner might also be able to terminate the administrative 
proceeding and sue for declaratory judgment if the copyright owner files a notice of intent to 
participate in the administrative proceeding.  The petitioner would argue that the notice of 
intent to participate generates a concrete case or controversy under Article III and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.  See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (discussing the case 
or controversy requirement).    If the courts did accept this argument, it would further 
bolster the case against mandating a full evidentiary hearing in the administrative process, 
but this is a speculative enough issue that it is not necessary to the argument.  
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 c. Article III 
Finally, an opponent of the proposal might argue that even if 
the administrative process is constitutional, judicial review of a Fair 
Use Ruling would not be.  On this view, it is not the job of the federal 
courts to determine whether an administrative agency has correctly 
issued an advisory opinion. Although one can imagine a more 
thoroughgoing attack, let us limit discussion to its strongest version – 
the court lacks jurisdiction in a case in which the copyright owner has 
chosen not to participate and in which the Board has ruled against the 
petitioner. The impulse behind this argument is understandable.  Under 
the proposal, petitioners such as those in the declaratory judgment case 
described above208 who were dismissed from federal district court for 
lack of jurisdiction would now have direct access to a federal appellate 
court on exactly the same facts.  How can that be? 
The answer is that the constitutional posture of the case would 
be materially different because the proposal has inserted the Fair Use 
Board into the process and has granted the Board the power to 
determine conclusively that an individual does not commit copyright 
infringement under particular circumstances.  The constitutional (and 
statutory) question in the declaratory judgment setting is whether there 
is a live dispute between the user and the copyright owner, and silence 
on the part of the owner is sufficient to render the answer negative.  In 
contrast, under the proposal, the case now assumes a familiar posture 
in which the question is whether an agency exercised its power 
according to law, and there would be a live controversy between the 
Copyright Office and the user. 
Although this should be a complete answer for Article III 
purposes, a critic may still regard this as bootstrapping or sleight of 
hand.  But it is not.  It is true that through de novo review, the court will 
determine the legal question as it might have in a declaratory judgment 
proceeding, but the concerns about advisory opinions that animate the 
case-or-controversy requirement should be assuaged in this posture.  
The question presented will be concrete because of the specificity of 
the proposed use required in the administrative proceeding, and the 
legal issues will be fully briefed because the Office, by having ruled 
 
208 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
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against the petitioner, will present the case against fair use and the 
petitioner will present the case in favor. 
One other jurisdictional argument might be made, according to 
which jurisdiction should be declined because the dispute should not 
be considered ripe. Ripeness issues arise when the agency’s advisory 
opinion is one of many means by which an agency interprets and 
applies its implementing statute. Those decisions holding that an 
advisory opinion is not final agency action hold, by implication, that 
when such an opinion is final action, it is subject to review.209 Under 
this proposal a Fair Use Ruling would be the Copyright Office’s only 
means of interpreting Section 107, and therefore by necessity they will 
be final agency action.  
 
2.  On the Merits of a Fair Use Board 
Skeptics are likely to oppose this proposal with three arguments: 
(1) it would be unfair; (2) it would be inefficient; or (3) it would distort 
judicial development of the fair use doctrine.  Interestingly, the 
proposal is likely to draw offsetting complaints on each of these 
grounds from some institutional copyright owners and from 
proponents of more vigorous user’s rights.  I consider these in turn. 
 
a. Fairness 
Some copyright owners are likely to complain that instituting 
such a procedure would unfairly diminish the value of copyright 
ownership.  On this view, copyright owners would have to expend 
precious resources monitoring and litigating fair use petitions.  In 
particular, they would be burdened to supply evidence concerning the 
fourth fair use factor concerning harm to the copyright owner’s market 
because the Board would otherwise lack sufficient information to make 
reasonable judgments on this score.  Finally they would argue that the 
anticipatory nature of the adjudication would make application of the 
fourth factor particularly difficult to assess and would lead to a high 
error rate. 
 Undoubtedly, large copyright owners would want to devote 
some resources to monitoring and participating in fair use adjudication.  
 
209 See, e.g., United States Defense Committee v. FEC, 861 F.2d 765, 771-72 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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Bearing this burden, however, would hardly be unfair.  This proposal 
merely creates a new procedure by which the scope of copyright 
owners’ legal entitlements can be ascertained, but it does nothing to the 
entitlements themselves.  The volume of fair use petitions will increase 
or decrease in proportion to copyright owners’ willingness to 
acknowledge users’ fair use rights.  If copyright owners are willing to 
alter their bargaining stance in the shadow of the Fair Use Board, they 
can exercise considerable control over the flow of petitions. 
 Furthermore, in the main, copyright owners will not be 
penalized if they choose not to participate and rely on the independent 
judgments of the Fair Use Board instead.  As has been noted, these 
judgments are likely to be skewed in favor of the copyright owners.  
The only petitions likely to be materially affected by the copyright 
owner’s participation are those involving uses for which the copyright 
owner contends there is a potential market that will be harmed under 
the fourth fair use factor.  But, even if the copyright owner chooses to 
forgo submitting evidence of an emerging market, a favorable fair use 
ruling would be non-binding as to any other parties and would not 
prejudice the copyright owner’s ability to prove the emerging market in 
litigation or with respect to a subsequent petition. 
 Finally, the costs of monitoring fair use petitions would be 
offset in some measure by the useful data the petitions will yield 
concerning how a work of authorship is being used and valued.  Say, 
for example, that the owner of a copyright in a narrative work is served 
with a number of petitions concerning derivative works involving a 
minor, quirky character in the narrative.  Such petitions would send a 
signal about demand for further development of that character, which 
the copyright  owner could undertake or license to others to undertake. 
 Users’ rights advocates would be likely to raise a separate 
fairness concern.  Some may argue that the availability of such a 
procedure would serve to prejudice users’ rights because the availability 
of an administrative procedure could create an expectation that it be 
used in all cases.210 Courts may be led to disfavor defendants who 
choose to rely on their own fair use judgments, and a potential fair user 
may, at a minimum, feel obliged to explain why he or she made a 
purported fair use without having first sought an advisory opinion.  
 
210 Cf. Justin Hughes, Introduction to David Nimmer’s Modest Proposal, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENTER. L. J. 1, 5 (2006) (posing questions about potential adverse inferences in relation to 
David Nimmer’s fair use proposal, discussed infra at notes 156-59 and accompanying text). 
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This concern is meritorious.  However, even if the proposal were to 
have this prejudicial effect, the net effect of this proposal should be a 
greater exercise of fair use rights given the dismal state of fair use 
reliance in the current environment. 
 
b. Efficiency – The Value of Fair Use 
The fairness arguments may also be packaged in efficiency 
terms.  On this view, skeptics on both sides are likely to complain that 
the benefits of private fair use adjudication would not be worth the 
price.  Opponents of the proposal are likely to minimize the benefits of 
fair use clarification and to focus on, and perhaps exaggerate, private 
and public administrative costs.  These opponents will then declare the 
proposal wasteful.   
 To evaluate this argument, one must make a normative 
judgment about the value of fair use and about the value of fair use 
clarification.  I have argued that providing greater clarity about users’ 
fair use rights will be extremely valuable because it broadens access to 
fair use and it should produce positive dynamic effects.  The value of 
fair use clarification increases to the extent one embraces fair use as a 
free speech safeguard.  Uncertainty about the scope of speech rights 
leads to chilling effects.  In the First Amendment context, the law has 
taken special measures to mitigate these effects, in particular through 
the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.211 
211 Professor Richard Fallon summarizes the overbreadth doctrine as follows: 
 
Against the background of the ordinary rule that no one can challenge a 
statute on the ground that it would be unconstitutional as applied to 
someone else, a First Amendment exception has emerged. When speech 
or expressive activity forms a significant part of a law's target, the law is 
subject to facial challenge and invalidation if: (i) it is "substantially 
overbroad"--that is, if its illegitimate applications are too numerous 
"judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," and (ii) no 
constitutionally adequate narrowing construction suggests itself. 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 853, 863 (1991) (citations 
omitted). 
 The First Amendment vagueness doctrine also is animated by concerns about  
chilling protected speech.  Rather than an exception, however, this doctrine is a more 
demanding version of its due process relation.  See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-
73 (1974) (“Where a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, 
is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [vagueness] 
doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.”). 
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 These doctrines do not import neatly into copyright law because 
in the traditional First Amendment setting, the court must balance the 
government’s interest in regulating speech against the speaker’s and 
audience’s interest in communicating.  In a copyright case, courts view 
the government’s interest in suppressing second-generation authors’ 
speech as a means to encourage first-generation authors’ speech.212 
Vagueness and uncertainty in this context might then be defended as 
having speech-protective features.213 However, it is not vagueness and 
uncertainty themselves that are speech-protective, but the context-
sensitive definitions of the legal entitlements that protect speech.  
Vagueness and uncertainty merely are by-products of that design.  This 
Article’s proposal enables the law to maintain its context-sensitive 
entitlements while creating a procedure to dispel the fog of fear, 
uncertainty and doubt that shrouds them, thereby achieving the ends of 
the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines by different means. 
 Users’ rights advocates will not deny the importance of 
protecting user’s freedom of expression, but some will argue that this 
proposal will not be effective at achieving that goal because the 
procedure will be too lengthy and cumbersome for most potential fair 
users, particularly creators seeking to make a derivative use of a 
copyrighted work.   It is true that this proposal will not immediately 
solve the problems of creators who need very rapid fair use 
determinations.  However, over time, a range of patient creators would 
find the process worth the wait.  These could be documentary 
filmmakers working independently, scholarly authors, web site owners 
who wish to add a feature that includes a copyrighted work, etcetera.  
As these creators use the proposed process, an administrative, and 
perhaps, judicial fair use jurisprudence will emerge from the process.  
As has been argued above, these developments will have positive 
spillovers for others seeking fair use clarification.  In the long run, 
then, the arguments concerning efficiency favor this proposal. 
 
212 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) 
(labeling copyright the “engine of free expression” because it makes author’s speech 
marketable);  
213 See Tushnet, supra note 30, at 70 (arguing that vagueness attendant to fair use and 
idea/expression more speech protective than copyright regime with rule-like definition of 
scope). 
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 c. Fair Use Jurisprudence 
Not all observers would agree that the spillover effects of this 
proposal would be positive.  Indeed, the dynamic effects of the 
proposal may be of greatest concern to critics on both sides.  The 
proposal would increase access to fair use.  Undoubtedly, if adopted, 
the proposal would lead to the creation of a body of Fair Use Rulings 
analogous to the body of Private Letter Rulings by the Internal 
Revenue Service and No Action Letters by the Enforcement Bureau of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.  As has been the case in 
those areas of law, this body of non-binding fair use rulings would be 
likely to influence the development of binding fair use decisions by the 
federal courts. 
 Some critics will argue that this influence would be corrosive.  
In their view, the Copyright Office has become a captured agency.  
They will argue that the Board will also be captured and will give fair 
use a very cramped reading.  The proposal acknowledges this risk.  On 
balance, however, the professionalism of the administrative 
decisionmakers should reduce the scope of this risk, and the availability 
of de novo judicial review should serve as an important corrective in the 
event that this risk is realized.  For example, any self-respecting 
copyright lawyer would hold that an author’s quotation of two lines 
from the lyrics of a popular song is a fair use, notwithstanding the 
routine practice of music publishers to quote a license fee for such a 
use.214 
The argument may shift to a concern about distortions in fair 
use jurisprudence because fair use petitioners may not be able to 
adequately represent their interests before the Board or a court.  This 
view suggests a principle by which access to adjudication should be 
increased only if there is a concomitant increase in access to legal 
representation.  To my mind, this argument is too idealistic, and it 
should not be surprising that a pragmatic proposal such as this might 
be unpalatable on that view.  But even for the idealist, there is some 
hope because pro bono assistance to some fair users might be available 
through committees of lawyers for the arts found in many cities.215 In 
 
214 [Find Cite] 
215 See, e.g., StarvingArtistLaw, Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts (listing groups offering pro bono 
legal assistance to artists by state) at 
http://www.starvingartistslaw.com/help/volunteer%20lawyers.htm (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
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addition, a number of law schools now offer intellectual property 
clinics that might be available to represent fair users.216 
If the real jurisprudential argument centers on the likely 
outcomes of appellate litigation regardless how well represented a 
petitioner may be, I am unpersuaded.  In my view, the appellate courts 
are the best-situated governmental decisionmakers to properly 
understand and apply the fair use doctrine’s allocation of expressive 
freedoms.217 A more subtle critique would be that even if appellate 
courts are the best-situated adjudicators of fair use, they may be led 
astray if they receive a case in the posture of an appeal from an adverse 
Fair Use Ruling.  In such a case, the courts may be more likely to defer 
to the views of the allegedly captured Fair Use Board than the views of 
a district court.  In this way, the mutually mediating relationship 
between the courts and the Board will lead to the ratification of a 
circumscribed view of fair use. 
 This critique has force.  But baselines matter.  Starting from the 
current situation, in which fair use is greatly underutilized, we already 
have a situation in which fair use has been greatly circumscribed de 
facto.  Even if this proposal were to lead to a subtly more 
circumscribed fair use jurisprudence, the de facto scope of fair use will 
still have increased because of the greater security the proposal offers 
to fair users.  Moreover, I have greater confidence in the independence 
of the judiciary than do these critics.  Some courts certainly would be 
tempted to defer to rulings of the Fair Use Board, but over time 
stronger jurists on the appellate bench would be likely to independently 
evaluate the proper scope of the doctrine. 
 
D. Good Policy, Bad Politics? 
Readers who are at this point persuaded that the proposal 
would improve copyright law may nonetheless harbor skepticism about 
its political prospects.  As a practical matter, for this proposal to 
become law, it would have to garner the support of the Copyright 
Office and at least avoid resistance from any of the larger organizations 
 
216See http://www.law.berkeley.edu/clinics/samuelson/about.html;
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/mission;
http://www.wcl.american.edu/clincial/ipclinic.cfm.
217 Accord McDonnell & Volokh, supra note 116 at 2468-69. 
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that represent copyright owners.218 The discussion above explains why 
the principal proposal is not a threat to the interests of copyright 
owners.  Indeed this proposal should be even more welcome than the 
pending orphan works legislation promoted by the Copyright Office.219 
The orphan works bill is analogous to this Article’s principal proposal 
insofar as the bill is designed to promote ex ante certainty with respect 
to uses of expressive works whose copyright owner cannot be 
identified through a reasonably diligent search. 
 However, as of August 2006, the bill was opposed by certain 
copyright owner representatives, primarily photographers, who argue 
that the remedial relief offered by the bill merely shifts uncertainty 
from users to copyright owners, who would have to worry that their 
works might erroneously be deemed orphaned.220 In contrast, this 
Article’s principal proposal would provide certainty on both sides 
because the copyright owner would receive notice and an opportunity 
to participate with respect to a concrete proposed or actual use.  Even 
for copyright owners, such as photographers, who admit that they may 
be difficult for users to find, the Fair Use Board would still protect 
their interests by independently evaluating whether a proposed use was 
fair. 
 Even if the proposal gains some support from some copyright 
owners and avoids resistance from others, there are reasons to believe 
that the Copyright Office and the Librarian of Congress may not be 
enthusiastic supporters in the near term.  Although some of the 
administrative law literature indicates that agencies reflexively seek self-
aggrandizement, the Copyright Office generally has been cool toward 
expansion of its regulatory and adjudicative functions.221 Creation of a 
 
218 See, e.g., Thomas P. Olson, The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to Proposed 
Copyright Reforms Since 1909, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 109 (1989) (identifying veto points in 
legislative process). 
219 The Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 22, 2006) at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5439. .
220 See, e.g., Daryl Lang, Congress to Consider Softer Version of Orphan Works Bill, PHOTO 
DISTRICT NEWS, May 23, 2006, at 
http://www.pdnonline.com/pdn/search/Article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002540997
(visited Aug. 25, 2006); Advertising Photographers of America, Urgent Message Regarding 
Orphan Works Bill, (undated) (urging members to lobby against bill’s passage) at 
http://www.apanational.com/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=3607 (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
221 See, e.g., Marybeth Peters, Statement of the United States Copyright Office 
to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Committee on the 
Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, Mar. 29, 
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Fair Use Board would place the Office in unfamiliar territory and 
would likely present some management, budgetary, and public relations 
challenges that Office personnel might just as well avoid.  In my view 
these concerns can be addressed and overcome in the course of 
deliberations over this proposal. 
 The prospects for this proposal, then, turn on the intensity of 
demand for clarification of fair use and the Copyright Office’s comfort 
level with the increasingly administrative character of copyright law.222 
In my view, conditions are ripe for this proposal to be enacted, but 
inertia and intransigence in some quarters may make this idea a little 
ahead of its time.  In the event that this is the case, I offer two less 
effective but potentially more palatable clarification proposals in 
Section III.  
 
E. Summary 
Creating a Fair Use Board would materially improve copyright 
law’s ability to balance the expressive freedoms of authors, distributors 
and users of copyrighted works without requiring Congress to reopen 
the terms of the underlying legislative entitlements.  The proposal 
simply would extend to copyright law the benefits of anticipatory 
adjudication that already are enjoyed by those who must interpret and 
apply similarly complex statutory schemes in areas such as income 
taxation, securities regulation, election law, health law, and highway 
safety. The beneficiaries of the proposal include more than the 
copyright owners and petitioners who would appear before the Fair 
Use Board because the Board’s decisions and judicial review thereof 
will improve the clarity of this area of law, as has been the case in other 
areas of the law that implement advisory opinion procedures.  Finally, 
the proposal is fiscally responsible and would require only a modest 
appropriation that could be offset through revenues generated by filing 
fees. 
 
2006, Remedies for Small Copyright Claims (cautiously offering to study issues related to 
establishing small claims tribunal for copyright cases). 
222 See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, N. C. L. REV. (2004). 
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III. FIXING FAIR USE: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 
Section II argues that the best way to solve the problem of ex 
ante uncertainty in copyright law is to provide ex ante clarity through 
anticipatory adjudication.  In the event that the political tide has not 
risen sufficiently to make safe passage for this approach to fair use 
clarification, I sketch in this section two less effective proposals to fix 
fair use that could be more readily steered through the legislative shoals 
and briefly address why proposals to fix fair use by rendering it more 
rule-like through legislation should be resisted. 
 
A. Reallocating Risks of an Erroneous Fair Use Judgment 
If users of copyrighted works whose proposed use is a fair use 
cannot be offered the prospect of ex ante immunity, they should at least 
be granted some relief by reducing the outsize threat that the remedial 
provisions of the Copyright Act currently impose in many cases.  This 
is essentially the same approach as is taken in the pending orphan 
works bill.  Limits on ex post relief are less satisfactory than the 
anticipatory adjudication proposed in Section II because these limits 
will apply when a user has erred in her fair use judgment and has 
infringed a copyright owner’s rights.  Thus, the ex post approach 
imposes rough justice by potentially undercompensating some 
copyright owners in order to induce more users to exercise their rights 
of fair use.  While not ideal, this rough justice would still improve the 
current situation in which uncertainty about fair use has chilled far too 
many users and has rendered fair use an uninsurable risk in important 
settings. 
 
1. Fair Use Rulings as Limit on Liability 
If Congress were unwilling to grant the Fair Use Board the 
power to immunize a petitioner from all liability, Congress should still 
create a Fair Use Board and alter the legal effect of a Fair Use ruling to 
be a limitation on liability.  Under this version of the proposal, all of 
the procedures outlined above would stay the same.  In the event that a 
Fair Use Judge declared a proposed use to be fair, and the copyright 
owner subsequently sued for infringement, the petitioner could be held 
liable only for actual damages and would not be liable for the copyright 
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owner’s attorney’s fees.  Injunctive relief would remain available to the 
copyright owner. 
 This version of the proposal resonates with other provisions or 
proposals to use non-binding adjudication as a means of clarifying the 
scope of intellectual property rights.  For example, the United 
Kingdom recently amended its patent law to give the U.K. Patent 
Office authority to provide a non-binding opinion concerning patent 
validity or infringement for ^200 to assist parties with licensing and 
litigation decisions.223 
In addition, treatise author David Nimmer has advanced a 
proposal analogous to this alternative.224 Under the Nimmer proposal, 
Congress would provide for non-binding fair use arbitration to be 
funded entirely by the parties.225 Although non-binding, the arbitration 
decision could be used by either party to influence the remedy for 
infringement.  An unfavorable decision would be admissible as 
evidence of willfulness.  A favorable decision would limit the copyright 
owner’s remedy to that proposed by the Copyright Office for 
infringement of an orphan work.226 A favorable decision also would be 
admissible as relevant to the question of attorney’s fees.227 
2. Broaden Relief for Good Faith 
In the alternative, if Congress does not see fit to create a Fair 
Use Board, it should fix fair use by reducing the scope of liability for 
those who infringe with an erroneous but good faith belief that the 
infringing use was a fair use.  One reason that potential fair users are 
 
223 See Patents Act of 2004, § 13, available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2004/40016--a.htm#13 (visited Apr. 5, 2006); see also 
http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/opinions/faq.htm (describing procedures for requesting 
opinion) (visited Apr. 5, 2006). 
224 See David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENTER. L.J. 11 (2006) (proposing The Fair Use Determination Given Expeditiously 
under the Statutory Indicia for Calibrating Liability and Enforcement Act ("The 
FUDGESICLE Act"). 
225 A petitioner would pay $1,000 and the copyright owner would also have to pay $1,000 if 
he, she, or it wished to participate and submit the matter to a single arbitrator.  If either party 
preferred a panel of three arbitrators, such party could designate the matter as complex and 
be required to pay an additional $9,000.  See id. at 12 n.3. 
226 See id. (incorporating by reference UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON 
ORPHAN WORKS, Jan. 31, 2006, which proposes adding a new remedial section to Copyright 
Act). 
227 See id. 
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unwilling to challenge overreaching by aggressive copyright owners is 
that the penalties for doing so can be quite severe.228 
Under this alternative proposal, the availability of injunctive 
relief should be curtailed and statutory damages should be unavailable 
against those who use a copyrighted work in good faith but with a 
mistaken belief that such as use was a fair use.  If the copyright owner 
were limited to proving actual damages flowing from a colorable fair 
use, the damages would be less attractive, reducing the threat of 
litigation and potentially increasing the owner’s willingness to offer 
reasonable terms to license colorable fair uses. 
 The Copyright Act already makes some allowance for innocent 
infringers, by lowering the floor for statutory damages to $200 where 
an infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her 
acts constituted an infringement of copyright.229 However, courts do 
not accept this defense readily.230 In addition, for members of certain 
privileged classes of users who prove that they made an unauthorized 
reproduction of a copyrighted work with a good faith belief that 
making such a copy or copies was a fair use, statutory damages are to 
be remitted.231 
Under this alternative, Congress would make the defense of 
innocent infringement more robust and would extend the benefits 
currently granted to special classes of users to all users who exercise 
any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights with an objective and 
subjective good faith belief that such use was a fair use.  Other 
commentators have proposed limited expansions of the remittance 
privilege under Section 504(c)(2) in the field of education.232 For the 
reasons stated above, however, fixing fair use is necessary for all users. 
 Section 504(c)(2) should be amended to limit monetary liability, 
including attorneys’ fees, and to limit the availability of injunctive relief 
 
228 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (describing remedial provisions of Copyright 
Act). 
229 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
230 See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Intern., Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 995-97 
(9th Cir. 1998) (upholding denial of fair use defense, denial of innocent infringement defense 
and award of $60,000 statutory damage award for unauthorized distribution of work 
containing news footage of 1992 riots in Los Angeles); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's 
Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522, 1544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  
231 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
232 See, e.g., Robert Kasunic, Fair Use And The Educator's Right To Photocopy Copyrighted Material 
For Classroom Use, 19 J.C. & U.L. 271, 291-92 (1993). 
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to cases in which a colorable fair use would have a deleterious effect on 
the copyright owner’s actual market from an ex post perspective, such 
as a use that would displace actual licensing opportunities unless 
enjoined.  In most cases of mistaken but good faith judgments of fair 
use, the defendant will be liable for a reasonable royalty as actual 
damages for colorable fair uses that do not harm copyright owner’s 
existing markets. 
 
B. Fair Use Rules 
A different approach to improving ex ante certainty would be to 
amend the Copyright Act to create a list of privileged uses or, less 
forcefully, to create a list of presumptively fair uses or safe harbors.  
Versions of this approach have been taken through the narrow 
privilege of “fair dealing” recognized in commonwealth countries such 
as the United Kingdom,233 Canada,234 and Australia.235 
Indeed, in the United States our experience with fair use rules 
has been primarily in relation to the educational guidelines. These 
guidelines serve a useful purpose because they identify safe harbors, 
that is, certain uses that copyright owner representatives have indicated 
will not be likely to draw an infringement suit.  As Professor Kenneth 
Crews correctly notes, these safe harbors reflect enforcement policies 
of certain groups of copyright owners rather than interpretations of the 
Copyright Act, and these guidelines should not be interpreted as 
substitutes for fair use.236 
However, it certainly would be possible to promulgate fair use 
rules either directly by legislation or through rulemaking under the 
auspices of the Copyright Office.237 The principal objection to fair use 
 
233 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 ch. III at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/Ukpga_19880048_en_4.htm#mdiv28 (visited Aug. 
25, 2006). 
234 Canadian Copyright Act § 29 at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-42/230536.html#rid-
230548 (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
235 See Australian Copyright Act of 1968 §§ 40-47h at 
http://scaletext.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/244/top.htm#39B (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
236 See generally Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001) (discussing these attempts and identifying circumstances in which 
guidelines have been misunderstood or misused). 
237 This is assuming that such rulemaking would be constitutional.  See supra notes 126-35 
and accompanying text (discussing potential constitutional objections to rulemaking by 
Copyright Office).  Alternatively, an executive agency such as the Commerce Department, 
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rules is the general objection to rules: the costs of over- and under-
inclusivity outweigh the benefits of ex ante certainty and cheaper 
administrability.  As Congress recognized when codifying fair use, 
rulemakers will be unable to predict the range of uses for copyrighted 
works, particularly as technological evolution enables new uses and 
new markets for such uses.238 Consequently, my views align with Judge 
Leval’s239 on this subject because ex ante rulemaking lacks the important 
context-sensitivity that the proposals submitted above would preserve. 
 To be clear, the proposals above imagine the possible 
emergence of soft rules through repeated adjudication, and these would 
further improve ex ante certainty about fair use.  The primary proposal 
would fix fair use for many users even if the doctrine were entirely ad 
hoc because certainty could be had for a particular use.  In fact, 
however, uses fall into patterns and over time the process of 
adjudication can yield some certainty concerning select uses. 
 The principal proposal would seed the process for improved 
development of similar soft rules for other uses by providing a record 
of adjudication of a range of uses.  While these adjudications would be 
non-precedential, over time, if a particular use were to be the subject of 
numerous petitions and the outcomes were predominantly in one 
direction or the other, users would gain a degree of improved certainty 
about the legality of potential uses.240 This process would be far more 
flexible and fine-grained than any legislative or regulatory approaches 
to fair use rules would likely be and it is therefore preferable. 
 
which houses the United States Patent and Trademark Office, might be granted such 
regulatory authority. 
238 House Report at 65-66 (“[T]he endless variety of situations and combinations of 
circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes formulation of exact rules in the 
statute.”). 
239 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1135 (1990) (“A 
definite [fair use] standard would champion predictability at the expense of justification and 
would stifle intellectual activity to the detriment of the copyright objectives.  We should not 
adopt a bright-line standard unless it were a good one – and we do not have a good one.”). 
240 Arguably this is what has happened with respect to use of domain names under the 
ICAAN Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy.  http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-
24oct99.htm An oft-litigated issue has been the use of a trademark in a domain name of the 
form www.[trademark]sucks.com. Courts routinely have held such uses to be non-
infringing.  Arbitrators issuing non-precedential decisions under the UDRP have been less 
uniform. However, the pattern is now consistent enough that it is clear enough that a 
“[trademark]sucks” second-level domain will be non-infringing, at least if the content of the 
site reflects some speech critical of the trademark owner. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Copyright law must respond to the rise of copyright-owner 
aggression and its chilling effects and respond to increasing uncertainty 
surrounding uses of new technologies by providing greater ex ante 
certainty about the scope of fair use or by reducing the risks of relying 
on fair use through ex post relief. 
 The best way to improve certainty concerning fair use would be 
to institute an administrative procedure to provide anticipatory, non-
precedential adjudications that would offer immunity from suit.  Such a 
procedure would maximize ex ante certainty for fair users and copyright 
owners in individual cases, would lead to a more robust body of fair 
use interpretations that others could refer to for guidance, and would 
reduce the frequency of unreasonable bargaining impasse in the 
shadow of such a procedure. 
 In the alternative, Congress should fix fair use by providing ex 
post relief for users who erroneously rely on fair use in good faith.  This 
can be done either through the anticipatory adjudication procedure 
contemplated in the primary proposal or by reducing the range of 
remedies in the copyright owner’s arsenal that can be deployed against 
such users.  An alternative solution, the creation of legislative or 
regulatory fair use rules, would improve ex ante uncertainty at the 
expense of the flexibility that lies at the heart of the fair use doctrine.  
The social costs of the under- and over-inclusivity that such rules 
would impose in the face of technological and expressive evolution 
outweigh the benefits of this approach to improved certainty in fair use 
law.  
